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The government, particularly the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), heavily regulates the life sciences industry. FDA actions can
have an extraordinary influence on the fortunes of biotechnology com-
panies. Timely FDA approval of a drug or medical device can permit a
company to exploit an inviting market window. FDA product approval is,
in turn, tied to clinical test results which demonstrate "efficacy" and
safety. Delayed approval, unfavorable test results, or the denial of an
FDA application may ruin a company.
Beyond the FDA product approval process and related testing lie
FDA inspections and the possibility that the government will investigate
charges such as the submission of false data. Problems found by inspec-
tion or revealed by investigation can, in turn, influence FDA action on
further product approvals.
All of this makes regulatory events and clinical testing matters of
great concern to both the managers of life sciences companies and inves-
tors in those companies. What biotechnology companies disclose-and
decide against disclosing-about such events can influence the price of
those companies' stocks. These disclosure decisions, therefore, can have
important securities law implications. Inaccurate statements-and, under
some circumstances, decisions to keep information about regulatory and
testing developments within the company rather than including it in a
public statement-may lead to private lawsuits, Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") enforcement actions, and even criminal prosecu-
tions.
This article addresses issues arising from disclosures about:
a) FDA product approval, particularly predictions about such
approval;
b) Clinical tests;
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c) Communications with the FDA before product approval; and
d) FDA inspections, government investigations, and the possi-
ble consequences of such actions.
The recent adoption of Regulation FD' emphasizes that life sciences
companies must communicate information on these four key subjects
directly, often making announcements in these critical areas to a market
that has not been alerted by analysts who have anticipated the news. All
of this increases the pressure on biotech executives who address the in-
vestment community.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "Reform Act")
2
does not remove the possibility that shareholders will sue on allegations
of inaccurate or incomplete disclosures. Some Reform Act protections
require disclosing companies to take affirmative steps. Life sciences ex-
ecutives can find it difficult, in the particular circumstances they face, to
take full advantage of the Reform Act's necessarily general provisions.
Moreover, the Reform Act applies only to private suits by shareholders,
not to enforcement actions by the SEC, which has been active in the bio-
tech arena.3
I. PREDICTING FDA APPROVAL
FDA approval is critical to a biotechnology product. Investors want
to know when such approval is likely. While there is no requirement that
life sciences companies forecast when the FDA will approve a product or
4even the timing of intermediate events in the FDA application process,
companies may nevertheless make predictions about approval to keep
shareholders informed. Even putting aside express predictions of FDA
1. Reg. FD, 17 C.FR. § 243.100 (2001). Reg. FD forbids companies from selectively
disclosing material developments to certain market participants, such as analysts. Instead,
companies must broadly disseminate such news so that it is available to all investors simulta-
neously.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
3. See infra Part H.D.
4. See, e.g., In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. See. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1993)
(affirming dismissal of complaint based on defendants' asserted failure to disclose financial
projections. The court quoted the SEC regulation that" '[riegistrants are encouraged, but not
required, to supply forward-looking information."' 984 F.2d at 1053 n.6, quoting 17 C.FR.
§ 229.303(a) Instruction 7). This principle should similarly foreclose any duty to publicize
internal company predictions that the FDA will deny product approval. See, e.g., In re Cryo-
medical Sciences, Inc. Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Md. 1995) ("Plaintiffs plead no facts
... which would lead the Court to believe that Cryomedical knew prior to FDA's official de-
nial that a denial ... would be forthcoming. Even if Cryomedical had suspicions, the
securities laws do not require disclosure of suspicions.") (emphasis added). Id. at 1020.
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action, biotech companies releasing financial forecasts frequently base
those predictions on assumptions about FDA approval!
A. When Is a Prediction False?
A company must make a "false" statement in order to be liable under
the securities laws. The mere circumstances that a company predicts the
FDA will approve a given product by a stated date, and that date passes
without any such approval, do not combine to make the prediction nec-
essarily "false." A prediction is not "false" under the securities laws
simply because it does not come true6 or because in hindsight a different
prediction would have been a more reasonable forecast Courts find a
prediction "false" if at the time the company made the prediction there
was no good faith, reasonable, objective basis for it, or (under some
tests) if those making a forecast knew some undisclosed fact that seri-
ously threatened the predicted event.'
5. FDA product approval action may also affect other disclosures, including descriptions
of contracts and reserve figures in financial statements. See SEC v. Diagnostics Data Inc.,
Litigation Rel. No. 9206 (S.E.C. Oct. 21, 1980) (consent injunction in settled action where the
SEC alleged a pharmaceutical research company falsely stated in proxy solicitations that li-
censing agreement-in-principle for anti-inflammatory drug was worth $5 million over the next
two years when, in fact, it contained provisions totaling only $2.5 million, $1.8 of which was
contingent upon FDA approval); Genentech, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,901, at 94,968-69 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1990) (denying in part a
motion to dismiss where plaintiffs claimed the company failed to establish a reserve for excess
inventory when "defendants knew over a year in advance, based on the FDA's delay in approv-
ing Activase for sale and its limited shelf life, that a large write-off for Activase inventory
would eventually be necessary.").
6. In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 E3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he fact that the
prediction proves to be wrong in hindsight does not render the statement untrue when made:');
DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1231 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (FDA's subsequent
rejection of company's application does not render earlier statements of optimism false or
misleading, when defendants had reasonable basis for statements.).
7. Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F3d 423, 433 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The statement, 'the storm is
passing and it will be sunny tomorrow,' when it in fact continues to snow the next day, may be
bad forecasting, but it is not necessarily a lie. Without more, it does not raise a strong infer-
ence of intentional or deliberately reckless falsity or deception:'); Grassi v. Info. Res., Inc., 63
F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Projections which turn out to be inaccurate are not fraudulent
simply because later events show that a different projection would have been more reason-
able-"); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 91,422, at 96,426 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2001) (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiffs'
"allegations are as consistent with a failure to predict the future accurately as they are with
fraud.").
8. Some courts have in the past relied on a three-part test to determine whether a predic-
tion is false:
A projection or statement of belief contains at least three implicit factual assertions:
(1) that the statement is genuinely believed, (2) that there is a reasonable basis for
that belief, and (3) that the speaker is not aware of any undisclosed facts tending to
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B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Protections
for Predictions: Cautionary Language and
Liability Only for Knowing Falsity
The Reform Act added sections to both the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide a "safe harbor" for
"forward-looking statements" that SEC-filing companies make.9 Predic-
tions of FDA approval should fall within the statute's definition of
"forward-looking statements."'
0
The safe harbor provides two principal protections. First, a company
is not liable for a forward-looking statement that is identified as such
"and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially"
seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement. A projection or statement of be-
lief may be actionable [i.e., "false" under the securities laws] to the extent that one
of these implied factual assertions is inaccurate.
In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
943 (1990); see also Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994) (employing the
same test); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 557 (6th Cir. 2001) (employing the same
test). Other courts have used an alternate test that appears to include only the first and second
Apple prongs, and these seem to be the common elements of the various definitions. Stransky
v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995); Kowal v. MCI Communica-
tions Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("projections ... are false ... if they were
issued without good faith or lacked a reasonable basis when made"); Herskowitz v. Nu-
tri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054 (1989).
Disbelief in a projection by itself, however, should be insufficient to establish falsity after
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095-96 (1991) (holding in a section
14 context that opinions are not actionable simply because disbelieved). At least one decision
holds that projections of future performance not worded as guarantees are generally not ac-
tionable under the federal securities laws at all. See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286,
290 (4th Cir. 1993).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1994 & Supp. mI 1997); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (1994 & Supp. Ill
1997).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5. The new law defined the term "forward-
looking statement" to include
a statement containing a projection of revenues, income... earnings ... per share,
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items ... a
statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations, includ-
ing plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer ... a
statement of future economic performance, including any such statement contained
in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management or in the re-
sults of operations included pursuant to rules and regulations of the Commission
... [and] any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any [of the
foregoing.]
15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(i)(1)(A)-(D); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1)(A)-(D). While a prediction of an
FDA approval date for a particular biotechnology product is not a projection of any of the
listed financial figures, it could certainly be phrased as an "objective of management' and
could also be disclosed as an assumption underlying predicted future financial performance.
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from those predicted." Second, the Reform Act restricts the companies
and executives liable for predictions to those who meet a high and strict
standard of culpability. Where a life sciences company makes a predic-
tion outside offering documents, shareholders are most likely to
challenge the prediction in a private securities lawsuit under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule lOb-5." In
addition to falsity, plaintiffs in such lawsuits must plead and prove that
the defendants had "scienter" which the Supreme Court has defined to
mean "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud."' 3 A majority of circuit courts have held that scienter encompasses
some form of extreme recklessness.'4 Under the Reform Act, however, a
company and its executives are not liable for a "forward-looking state-
ment" in a private shareholder lawsuit unless the plaintiff pleads and
proves that the defendants made the statement "with actual knowledge
... that [it] was false or misleading."'
5
Turning to the first protection, if a life sciences enterprise
accompanies a forward-looking statement predicting FDA approval with
"meaningful cautionary" language, the company should be able to
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(l)(A)(i); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934); 17 C.ER. § 240.10b-5 (1948).
13. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
14. VIII L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SEcURrrlES REGULATION 3665 n.521 (3d ed. 1991).
Most courts have defined recklessness for lob-5 purposes as "highly unreasonable" conduct
representing "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care... [so that the] danger
of misleading buyers or sellers ... is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
[defendant] must have been aware of it." The Seventh Circuit adopted this standard in Sun-
strand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977). At least one Court of Appeals decision appears to interpret the Reform Act to
heighten that standard. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 976-77 (9th
Cir. 1999) (viewing lob-5 recklessness "as a form of intentional or knowing misconduct"
applicable where the facts suggest "consciousness or deliberateness"); but see Howard v.
Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) (commenting that the Reform Act "did
not alter the substantive requirements for scienter under § 10(b)"). A number of post-Reform
Act opinions continue to employ the Sunstrand definition. See Florida State Board of Admin.
v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 653 (8th Cir. 2001); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc.,
267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245,
1258 (10th Cir. 2001); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 567 (Nov. 27, 2000); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1282 n.18 (I Ith Cir.
1999) (also invoking the term "severe recklessness"); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183
F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F3d 185, 198, 200 (1st Cir.
1999); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court
itself left open the question of whether recklessness would in any form satisfy the 1Ob-5 sci-
enter element. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(B) (if the statement is made by a natural person, a plaintiff
must prove that that individual had actual knowledge that the statement was false or mislead-
ing; if made by a business entity, a plaintiff must prove that it was made with the approval of
an executive officer who had actual knowledge that the statement was false or misleading).
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dismiss a lawsuit based on the circumstance that FDA approval did not
materialize at the predicted time. This should be true regardless of
plaintiffs' allegations about the defendants' mental state when they made
the prediction, and regardless of whether the factors expressly identified
by the company's cautionary language were the ones that eventually
caused the FDA to delay or deny approval. Congress expected
that the cautionary statements [will] identify important factors
that could cause results to differ materially-but not all factors.
Failure to include the particular factor that ultimately causes the
forward-looking statement not to come true will not mean that
the statement is not protected by the safe harbor. The Conference
Committee specifies that the cautionary statements identify "im-
portant" factors to provide guidance to issuers and [this is] not to
provide an opportunity for plaintiff counsel to conduct discovery
on what factors were known to the issuer at the time the for-
ward-looking statement was made.
The use of the words "meaningful" and "important factors" are
intended to provide a standard for the types of cautionary state-
ments upon which a court may, where appropriate, decide a
motion to dismiss, without examining the state of mind of the
defendant. The first prong of the safe harbor requires courts to
examine only the cautionary statement accompanying the for-
ward-looking statement. Courts should not examine the state of
mind of the person making the statement.1
6
As significant as this first protection is, it is uncertain how effective
it will be in stopping lawsuits based upon inaccurate forecasts of FDA
approval. The Conference Report made this comment on the cautionary
language needed to bring the first protection into play:
[B]oiler plate warnings will not suffice .... The cautionary
statements must convey substantive information about factors
that realistically could cause results to differ materially from
those projected in the forward-looking statement, such as, for
example, information about the issuer's business. 7
The central question is what cautionary language courts will find
"meaningful" and what they will consider "boilerplate" As this article
16. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 44 (1995) ("The applicability of the safe harbor
provisions [regarding cautionary statements] ... shall be based upon the sufficiency of the
cautionary language under those provisions and does not depend on the state of mind of the
defendant:' Id. at 47).
17. Id. at43.
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sets out below, some pre-Reform Act decisions considering the "be-
speaks caution" defense gave short shrift to express warnings that the
company was not making bankable predictions about FDA actions."
While the Reform Act's first protection for forward-looking statements is
stronger than the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, 9 it remains unclear what
language will suffice to shield forecasts from future lawsuits.
In re PLC Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation20 applies this first pro-
tection. The opinion found a number of statements, including that the
company believed its FDA application was "on track for approval this
year" to be within the Reform Act's safe harbor.2' The court quoted the
18. See discussion of Xoma and Marion Merrell Dow infra notes 74-78, 86-87 and ac-
companying text.
19. The "bespeaks caution" doctrine "'provides a mechanism by which a court can rule
as a matter of law (typically in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action or a
motion for summary judgment) that defendants' forward-looking representations contained
enough cautionary language or risk disclosure to protect the defendant against claims of secu-
rities fraud."' In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 868 (1995), quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Cau-
tion", 49 Bus. LAW. 481, 482-83 (1994). It "'has developed to address situations in which
optimistic projections are coupled with cautionary language-in particular, relevant specific
facts or assumptions-affecting the reasonableness of reliance on and the materiality of those
projections." Id. at 1414, quoting Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F3d 160, 167 (5th Cir. 1994)
(footnotes omitted). As applied by the Ninth Circuit in Worlds of Wonder, it comes into play
where defendants have employed "precise cautionary language which directly addresses itself
to future projections, estimates or forecasts." Id., quoting In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.,
814 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D.Cal 1993). Some commentators and cases suggest that the first
Reform Act protection for forward-looking statements is similar to the "bespeaks caution"
doctrine. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 988 (1996); Grossman v. Novell, Inc.,
120 F3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1997); Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1213
n.23 (1st Cir. 1996). However, "bespeaks caution" is limited by many decisions to instances in
which the cautionary statements identify the precise risks that matured to thwart the predicted
result. See, e.g., In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 E3d 309, 318 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 927 (1998). In contrast, the first Reform Act protection requires only that the
defendant identify "important factors" that could cause actual results to differ materially from
a prediction and does not require that the language include the exact risk that in fact caused
the prediction to fail. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, supra note 16, at 44; see also Harris
v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 1999), rehearing denied, 209 F.3d 616 (11th Cir.
2000), questioning whether
To be 'meaningful'... must the cautionary language explicitly mention the factor
that ultimately belies a forward-looking statement? We think not .... [W]hen an
investor has been warned of risks of a significance similar to that actually realized,
she is sufficiently on notice of the danger of the investment to make an intelligent
decision about it according to her own preferences for risk and reward.
20. In re PLC Systems, Inc. See. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 1999).
21. Id. at 117-18. (footnote omitted). The court characterized the following statements,
among others, as "aspiratory" and found them safe harbor-protected:
(1) "[Ihe Company believes that this data will satisfy the FDA's request;"
(2) "PLC believes its ... application ... is on track for approval this year;"
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following words as an example of the cautionary language PLC had in-
cluded in a 10-Q filing:
Although The Heart Laser has been granted "expedited review"
by the [FDA], given the current uncertainties of the time re-
quired by the FDA to approve a Pre-market Approval ("PMA")
appjication, the Company cannot project when, if at all, such ap-
proval would be granted. Until PMA approval, continued
profitability will likely be determined by the number of interna-
tional shipments and the related mix of sales and placements.2
Whether another court would find such language adequate to invoke
Reform Act protection might well depend on the court's view of whether
such phrases provide, under the circumstances, a fair warning. Life sci-
ences companies may wish to include additional details, cautioning
investors that FDA approval is contingent on many factors-including
clinical test results and the evaluation of those results 2-that make it
impossible to accurately predict when or whether the FDA will approve
the drugs or devices that the companies are developing. Companies may
wish to add further details, including that tests are based upon certain
protocols and are subject to human errors; that there may be several
ways in which to evaluate test results; and that even if the companies
conclude that tests provide evidence of a drug's or device's effectiveness
and safety, the agency may not agree because it may conclude that the
protocols were not sufficiently enforced, may evaluate the significance
of the test results differently, or may take a different view concerning the
effect of any human errors on those results during the trials.
While the first Reform Act protection for forward-looking state-
ments is straightforward and objective, the second protection-no
(3) "[E]xpedited review ... may compress the remaining process time .... ve be-
lieve the recent filing ... allows PLC Systems to remain on track for an FDA
approval this year;" and (4) "[W]e expect that full approval could be granted in the
summer months:'
Id. (alteration and emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 118 n.7 (alteration in original).
23. See also In re Columbia Lab., Inc. Sec. Litig., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001),
where the court wrote:
Defendants state that they [were] optimistic Advantage-S would pass all the
UNAIDS study ... and that they believed Columbia would receive FDA approval
within six months. Id. at 1368.
The Court finds that the language accompanying these forward-looking statements
qualif[ies] as meaningful cautionary language. The disputed statements were con-
sistently accompanied by language indicating that the product and projected results
depended on the successful completion of the UNAIDS study. Id. at 1369.
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liability absent "actual knowledge" that the prediction is false and mis-
leading-implicates the defendant's mental state. The Reform Act
requires that 1 Ob-5 plaintiffs plead "with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind." 4 Defendants may test such pleading with a motion to dismiss
before any discovery occurs because the Act imposes a discovery stay
during the pendency of such motions.2'
Many decisions interpret the "particularity" requirement strictly so
that, without any discovery, plaintiffs relying on "internal" documents or
discussions to show that defendants knew damning facts need to identify
and describe those documents or discussions in significant detail 6 Even
pre-Reform Act cases evinced concern that plaintiffs should plead the
details of internal documents instead of referring to them generally.
27
Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs rely on oral information, under the
Reform Act they must plead some facts about their sources, 2 although
the required particularity of identification is still in dispute.29
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
26. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 E3d 970, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1999)
(affirming dismissal of a complaint where allegations were based on internal reports, but
plaintiff failed to "mention ... the sources of her information with respect to the reports, how
she learned of the reports, who drafted them, or which officers received them.... We would
expect that a proper complaint which purports to rely on the existence of internal reports
would contain at least some specifics from those reports as well as such facts as may indicate
their reliability.'); In re Peritus Software Services, Inc. Sec. Litig., 52 F Supp. 2d 211,228 (D.
Mass. 1999) ("Stating that unnamed 'defendants' discussed 'major problems with the acquisi-
tion,' does not raise a strong inference that [a defendant] knew of the misleading nature of his
statement at the time it was made.').
27. See Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1467 (7th Cir. 1993); Weisburgh v. St. Jude
Medical, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 638, 643 (D. Minn. 1994), aff'd, 62 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1995) (un-
published table decision). Cf. Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 48 (1997) (reversing district court dismissal of a complaint based on inter-
nal spreadsheet accompanied by deposition testimony of company employees that the forecast
in the spreadsheet represented "the best, most accurate representation as of the time it was
prepared of what the company's financial results [would] be like for the prospective quarter").
28. In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1080 n.15 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (granting motion to dismiss in part because "[t]he S[econd] A[mended]
C[omplaint] alleges that 'confidential informants' provided some of the information alleged
therein, but does not specify what type of information they provided. Nor does it supply any
information that the Court might use to evaluate the confidential informants' basis for alleging
that the defendants had access to adverse information.').
29. In Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F3d 300, 313-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 567
(2000), the Second Circuit wrote that, while the Reform Act "may compel revelation of confi-
dential sources under certain circumstances," its "reading of the [Reform Act] reject[ed] any
notion that confidential sources must be named as a general matter.' The court added that
"even if personal sources must be identified, there is no requirement that they be named, pro-
vided they are described in the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the
probability that a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the information
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Putting all of this together, the Reform Act requires plaintiffs attack-
ing predictions of FDA approval to, at the outset of the case and without
any discovery, plead factual details giving rise to a strong inference that
defendants had "actual knowledge" that the prediction was false or mis-
leading." Plaintiffs will find this a substantial hurdle to clear."
It bears emphasis, however, that the Reform Act protections for
"forward-looking statements" do not apply at all to some statements,
such as those made in documents for an initial public offering?2 The
alleged." [emphasis added]. Novak disagreed with district court decisions that appeared to
require naming sources.
30. Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 429 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The complaint must... 'state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the re-
quired state of mind'-that is ... where the challenged act is a forward looking statement,
with 'actual knowledge ... that the statement was false or misleading "'); In re Advanta Corp.
Sec. Litig., 180 F3d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal where plaintiffs did "not
plead any specific facts to support an inference that ... [the individual speaker], or anyone
else at Advanta, had actual knowledge of her statement's falsity"); In re Ciena Corp. Sec.
Litig., 99 F. Supp. 2d 650, 661-62 (D. Md. 2000) (granting motion to dismiss because "plain-
tiffs have not alleged any particularized facts showing that defendants had actual knowledge
that any of the forward-looking statements were false or misleading-the substantive standard
they must meet to blow the statements out of the safe harbor").
31. See, e.g., In re Technical Chemicals Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91,045 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2000) (dismissing a complaint including allegations
that the company's "own scientists warned management that completion of the product could
take years.... Key measurement correlations ... still need[ed] to be developed.... [Com-
pany] scientists also informed management that it was impossible to predict a time for
submission of the product for FDA approval, and that numerous and significant scientific
breakthroughs would have to be made." Id. at 94,862. Plaintiffs also alleged "repeated warn-
ings from the on-site developers:' Id. The court found even these allegations too general:
Plaintiffs here fail to adequately explain the information in the scientists' posses-
sion, why it was reliable, or any other relevant details. What breakthroughs would
have to be made? Who were the on-site developers? More important, what specific
facts support the allegation that the company's development projections were un-
supported by facts in [the company's] possession at the time the company made the
projections?
Id. Overall, the court ruled that plaintiffs "failed to plead sufficient facts to give rise to a strong
inference that the statements, if false, were made with actual knowledge of their falsity." Id. at
94,864.).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b)(2)(D) (1994 & Supp. fI 1997); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2)(D)
(1994 & Supp. m 1997). Forward-looking statements in documents filed with the Commis-
sion do enjoy the protection of Rule 175 under the 1933 Act and Rule 3b-6 under the 1934
Act. 17 C.FR. § 230.175 (2001), 17 C.FR. § 240.3b-6 (2001). These rules provide that such a
statement "shall be deemed not to be... fraudulent.., unless it is shown that such statement
was made ... without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith:' These
rules apply to initial public offerings. 1C HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC AND THE
PUBLIC CORPORATION § 10.08, at 10-277 (2001). However, they provide less protection than
the Reform Act in part because they require investigation of the defendant's state of mind (to
determine "reasonable basis" and "good faith") and do not include anything like the first Re-
form Act protection, which is a complete defense if the forward-looking statement is
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.
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protections are similarly inapplicable to financial statements prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP").33 If
a faulty prediction of FDA approval leaves a company with unsalable
inventory' for which it has not reserved in GAAP-prepared financials,
defendants cannot rely upon the forward-looking statement protections
to defend against a lawsuit charging that the failure to reserve was
fraudulent. In addition, the protections apply only in private actions,* not
in SEC enforcement proceedings.
Finally, some decisions permit plaintiffs to avoid the Reform Act
protections by crafting their complaints to allege omission of the facts
causing predictions to fail rather than attacking the predictions as af-
firmative misstatements. In In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Securities
Litigation, the court denied a motion to dismiss in a case based, among
other things, on statements that a Phase III trial was on schedule and that
the company expected to file an application with the FDA in the first half
of 1999. Plaintiffs claimed the company failed to reveal that the trial in-
cluded many patients who did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the
study. When defendants argued that "statements regarding ... plans and
expectations for the NDA filing... [were] forward-looking," the court
responded that "'allegations based upon omissions of existing facts or
circumstances do not constitute forward looking statements protected by
the safe harbor of the Securities Act.' .3
Courts should be skeptical of plaintiff efforts to convert a case based
on an allegedly false prediction into one assertedly based on the nondis-
closure of the facts that supposedly made the prediction false. Plaintiffs
could so characterize most prediction cases. If such a characterization
routinely disables the Reform Act protections for forward-looking state-
ments, those protections will be meaningless. Congress could not have
intended that result.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b)(2)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2)(A).
34. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,901, at 94,968-69 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1990).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c).
36. In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,001, at 94,499 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000), quoting In re Mobilemedia, 28 F Supp. 2d 901,
930 (D.N.J. 1998). See also Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 669, 679
(W.D. Pa. 1998) (court denied motion to dismiss based in part on the argument that the "be-
speaks caution" doctrine or the Reform Act safe harbor protected company statements, finding
these protections inapplicable where "plaintiff's claims ... are based upon an allegation of
misrepresented historical or current facts... for example, that at the time the defendants' [sic]
made the statements ... each defendant already knew of the inadequate test results but con-
cealed such information from the public").
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That said, companies cannot afford to ignore the possibility that
plaintiffs may convince courts to categorize allegations that are actually
based on a published prediction as an omissions case. To guard against
this possibility, life sciences companies should review carefully what
they know when they make a prediction of FDA approval or financial
results assuming such an approval. They may decide to disclose-
perhaps as part of their cautionary language-facts which, although they
do not reduce the probability of anticipated outcomes so greatly that the
companies should not make the predictions, nevertheless might develop
into factors that could significantly change future results.
This article now considers other cases in which courts evaluated se-
curities claims based upon (1) express predictions of FDA approval and
(2) financial projections assuming such approval. While some of these
cases pre-date the Reform Act, they still yield helpful insights.
C. Express Predictions of FDA Approval
T\vo Ninth Circuit decisions and a district court case in Missouri-
all pre-Reform Act--dealt explicitly with projected FDA approvals. The
defendants in In Re Syntex Corporation Securities Litigation37 won, de-
feating plaintiffs on a motion to dismiss. The defendants in Warshaw v.
Xoma Corporation 3 prevailed on a motion to dismiss in the district
court, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The defendants in In re Marion
Merrell Dow Inc. Securities Litigation3 lost their motion to dismiss in
the trial court. More recently, the SEC, in In re Zila, Inc. and Joseph
Hines, entered a cease and desist order against a company in a settled
SEC administrative proceeding for persisting in predictions of FDA ap-
proval after receiving a communication that FDA staff would
recommend that approval be denied.'
Syntex produced a patented prescription drug called Naprosyn, used
to treat arthritis inflammation and pain. The Naprosyn patent was to ex-
pire in late 1993. In January 1992, Syntex predicted that the FDA would
approve an over-the-counter ("OTC") version of Naprosyn "well in ad-
vance of' the patent expiration. Plaintiffs claimed this prediction was
37. In re Syntex Corp. See. Litig., 95 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996).
38. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter "Xoma IF'].
39. In re Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,776 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 1993).
40. In re Zila, Inc. and Joseph Hines, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-10657, Order
Instituting Public Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-And-Desist Order (Dec. 19,
2001) [hereinafter "Zila Admin. Order"], http://www.sec.gov/Iitigation/admin/34-45169.htm.
41. In re Syntex, 95 F.3d at 930.
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"false" because Syntex had information that the investing public did not
possess about "deficiencies in ... testing procedures for the
[over-the-counter] drug such as problems with dosages and differences
between the drugs tested (which lacked sodium) and the OTC version of
Naprosyn (which contained sodium). ,42
In affirming the district court's decision to grant Syntex's motion to
dismiss, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the prediction was a long-
term one and that plaintiffs had failed to plead how any difficulties in
testing undermined that prediction. The Ninth Circuit even suggested
circumstances that could reconcile the alleged testing problems with the
projected approval date:
In estimating a date for FDA approval of OTC Naprosyn, Syntex
was making a prediction far in advance, while the drug was still
in the testing stage, about an approval decision that lies in the
hands of a regulatory body. Thus, Syntex was forecasting a fu-
ture event. Any alleged deficiencies in the testing procedures do
not indicate that Syntex's prediction of an FDA approval date
was false when made. Instead, the company could have known
of problems in the testing procedures, planned to remedy those
deficiencies, and still thought it would achieve FDA approval by
the estimated date. Clearly, Defendants' prediction of a date for a
regulatory decision over which they did not have control, made
that far in advance, for a drug that was still in the testing stages,
could not carry a guarantee of accuracy or reliability....
Nothing in this case indicates that the company had knowledge
contradicting its ability to achieve FDA approval within two
years and prior to the expiration of prescription Naprosyn's pat-
ent."
Three points merit discussion. First, the Syntex defendants made
their prediction quite some time before the approval date they fore-
casted.' The Ninth Circuit was properly more lenient in evaluating such
long-term projections, as compared to predictions of more immediate
42. Id.
43. Id.; see also Schuster v. Symmetricon, Inc., [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 91,206, at 95,031 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2000) (granting dismissal where "internal
communications speak of problems and even periodic 'failures' (or in one case a 'debacle'
during the Birmingham testing), but nowhere do they indicate a sense that the project would
not ultimately come through").
44. In addition, the FDA actually issued its approval for the over-the-counter drug only
three weeks after the Naprosyn patent expired. "Apparently the company was able to remedy
any defects in the testing procedures and in the drug itself." In re Syntex, 95 F.3d at 930-31.
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concern. The significance of an estimate that the FDA will approve a
given product by a specific date can be stated, in a statistical sense, in
terms of a "confidence interval"-e.g., that the company is 90% confi-
dent that the FDA will approve the product within a certain range of
months, with the stated date falling inside that range.45 Generally, the
farther out the prediction is made, the larger the time interval for any
given level of confidence will be. In less formal terms, common sense
argues for more leeway when a company predicts that an event will oc-
cur two years from today than when it predicts that an event will occur
tomorrow.
Second, plaintiffs may argue that such long-term predictions impose
a "duty to update." 46 For example, if a company has predicted FDA ap-.
proval for a product by a certain date and then, before that date arrives,
concludes that test results fall to demonstrate efficacy, plaintiffs may ar-
gue that the company has a duty to publicly update its forecast of
regulatory approval if the company concludes that the test results will
delay approval beyond the forecasted time or mean that the FDA will not
approve at all.
It is unclear to what extent there is any duty to update under the se-
curities laws. Some decisions suggest the possibility of such a duty
where the subject of the first statement is an extraordinary corporate
transaction or some such similarly important and out-of-the-ordinary
fact. But the Reform Act specifically stated that it was not imposing any
45. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Company, 892 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Commonwealth Edison made point estimates: [the two nuclear reactors] will cost $3.34
billion and start in 1984 and 1985. Everyone understands that point estimates are almost cer-
tainly wrong. Things will not go exactly as predicted, and any deviation will cause the future
to diverge from the estimate. Statisticians-and stock analysts-need confidence intervals to
go with the maximum-likelihood estimate. Commonwealth Edison might have said, for exam-
ple, that there is a two-thirds chance that the cost will fall in a given range, identifying the
events that would push the cost up or down within (or outside of) that range').
46. Backman v. Polaroid, 910 F2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We may agree that, in special
circumstances, a statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and connotation
upon which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning, and there is a change,
correction, more exactly, further disclosure, may be called for."); In re Time Warner, Inc. See.
Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v. ZVI Trading Corp. Em-
ployees' Money Purchase Pension Plan and Trust, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994) (company making
statements that could have been understood to mean that it hoped to solve its entire debt prob-
lem through strategic alliances may have been under duty to disclose consideration of dilutive
equity offering as an alternative means of raising capital); Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129
F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 1997) (company subject to takeover rumors had announced intended
debt/capitalization ratio, then made acquisition that increased the ratio and made the company
less attractive as a takeover target; "it was reasonable for an investor to expect that the com-
pany would make another such prediction if it expected the ratio to change markedly in the
ensuing year.'), on remand [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,266, at
95,468-69 (N.D. 111. Nov. 9, 2000) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment).
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duty to update.4 At least one Court of Appeals has questioned whether a
duty to update survives this legislation even when a company is involved
in an extraordinary transaction.43 Moreover, many recent cases are hostile
to a "duty to update," particularly outside the context of company-
transforming transactions. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Liti-
gation49 affirmed dismissal of complaint insofar as it alleged defendants
had a duty to update a statement by the issuer's chief accounting officer
that he was comfortable with certain analysts' earnings estimates."' More
recently, Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories5' rejected the notion that
companies have "an absolute duty to disclose all information material to
stock prices as soon as news comes into [the issuer's] possession."'
A prediction of FDA approval seems closer to an earnings estimate
than an extraordinary corporate transaction and, accordingly, should not
be subject to a duty to update. Moreover, issuers may be able to avoid
any "duty to update" by including cautionary statements to the effect that
a projection of FDA approval speaks only as of the date that the com-
pany releases the forecast and that the company is not assuming any duty
to update that projection.
Third, Syntex recognized that there are inherent uncertainties in the
FDA approval process, of which the market is well aware. This is impor-
tant because most shareholder class actions are based on the fraud-on-
the-market theory. Under that theory, individual shareholders need not
show they personally relied upon a misstatement, such as a prediction of
FDA approval. Instead, this economic construct assumes that the price of
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(d) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
48. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997).
49. 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997).
50. "[W]e do not think it can be said that an ordinary earnings projection contains an im-
plicit representation on the part of the company that it will update the investing public with all
material information that relates to that forecast.... We conclude that ordinary, run-of-the-
mill forecasts contain no more than the implicit representation that the forecasts were made
reasonably and in good faith." Id. at 1433.
Burlington Coat Factory distinguished the case in which a forward-looking statement in-
volves a fundamental change in the nature of a company, but noted that even then any duty to
update "would be a narrow one to update the public as to extreme changes in the company's
originally expressed expectation of an event such as a takeover, merger, or liquidation:' Id. at
1434 n.20. (emphasis in original); See also Grassi v. Information Resources, Inc., 63 E3d 596,
599 (7th Cir. 1995); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332, 1333 n.9 (7th Cir.
1995).
51. 269 F3d 806 (7th Cir. 2001).
52. Id. at 808. "We do not have a system of continuous disclosure'" Id. Instead, the 1933
Act "requires firms to reveal information only when they issue securities." Id. The 1934 Act
and accompanying regulations require issuers to file annual and other periodic reports, but
"contemplate that these reports will be snapshots of the corporation's status on or near the
filing date, with the updates due not when something 'material' happens, but on the next pre-
scribed filing date." Id. at 809.
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a security reflects all publicly disclosed information, including any pre-
dictions. "Market professionals" closely monitor company information
and react to it. Their recommendations and decisions drive the price. 3
These market professionals presumably know the rigors and difficulties
of FDA approval and discount a company's prediction, as the Syntex
court put it, "of a date for a regulatory decision over which [the company
does] not have control ... for a drug that [is] still in the testing stages. ' '
In Xoma, plaintiffs alleged very different facts. Xoma was develop-
ing a drug called E5, an antibody designed to treat gram-negative sepsis.
The critical events began on March 2, 1992, when an Oppenheimer ana-
lyst issued a report based on his review of two Phase III te sts raising the
possibility that "E5 actually increases mortality in a large percentage of
gram-negative sepsis patients." The analyst opined that Xoma had "no
hope" of winning FDA approval for E5.56 Xoma's president responded
by publicly stating that the analyst report was "scientifically wrong" and
"irresponsible," and that "everything is going fine" in the FDA review.
The president went on to say that E5 "decreases mortality as proven by
results from 1,300 patients including two Phase III studies, and four
other smaller studies.
'57
On April 14, 1992, Xoma disclosed that the FDA had said "a review
of the first [Phase III] clinical study of... E5... does not, by itself,
provide sufficient evidence of efficacy to support product licensure."
Xoma said that the FDA had advised "it is continuing its review of the
53. The Supreme Court endorsed the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 241-50 (1988), and commented specifically on the importance of "market
professionals:' Id. at 247 n.24.
54. In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit
has, in other contexts, similarly found that the market is aware of certain inherent problems in
the high technology industry. In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 948 F2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991)
("The market clearly knew demand for the [first generation] workstation would decrease as
Convergent began to make [the second generation workstation] available to its customers. As a
general matter, investors know of the risk of obsolescence posed by older products forced to
compete with more advanced rivals' Id. at 513).
55. For a description of the FDA testing process, see Padnes v. Scios Nova Inc., No. C
95-1693, 1996 WL 539711 at *10 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1996) ("New drugs typically pro-
ceed through three levels of testing prior to approval by the FDA. A Phase I study is conducted
in healthy patients and is designed to measure the safety of the drug. A Phase II study is in-
tended to gain preliminary evidence of the efficacy of the drug within a range of dosages.
Phase III studies are intensive clinical trials, with testing protocol controlled by FDA stan-
dards. A Phase III study is conducted to obtain sufficient data for statistical proof of both
safety and efficacy:').
56. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996).
57. Xoma-OpCo-3: Xoma President Disputes Oppenheimer E5 View, Dow Jones News
Service, Mar. 2, 1992.
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company's second [Phase II] study of E5."'58 In a second press release,
Xoma stated that it continued to believe that the two Phase I trials, con-
sidered together, showed effectiveness and that the FDA notification was
not a setback in the review process. The CEO/chairman of the board said
the notification was a sign that the FDA was moving forward.5 9
The next day, the media quoted Xoma's chairman/CEO as saying,
"We are confident that the drug is safe and efficacious and that it is mov-
ing forward well" in the review process. 60 Xoma issued a press release
saying that the FDA notification "doesn't imply 'a delay or setback in
the agency's review of E5.' [The] Xoma Chairman and Chief Executive
... said, 'Our announcement yesterday led to concerns in the market that
a significant problem had arisen in the FDA's review of E5. Those con-
cerns are unfounded; we think the market misunderstood the earlier
announcement and overreacted to it."' 6 Xoma's stock dropped 4 points
to 14 1/2.62
Three weeks later, Xoma's chairman/CEO again noted the "positive
forward progress" of the FDA review.63 A Dow Jones News Service arti-
cle reported that he said Xoma remained confident of FDA approval and
convinced that E5 was safe and effective and would be widely used to
treat patients suspected of having sepsis who had organ failure but were
not in refractory shock. The chairman/CEO reportedly said the Phase III
clinical trials of E5 demonstrated statistically significant decreases in
mortality and organ failure, that FDA inspections of the E5 manufactur-
ing facilities had been completed, and that inventories of the drug were
in place and ready for commercial shipment. 64
One month later, however, Xoma announced on June 4 that the FDA
had concluded additional testing might be necessary on E5.65 A story
quoted the chairman and CEO as saying that the FDA "felt there wasn't
58. FDA Review of Xoma Drug Study Doesn't Find License Evidence, Dow Jones News
Service, Apr. 14, 1992.
59. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 856 F. Supp. 561, 563 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1994) [hereinafter
"Xoma r'].
60. Id.; FDA Review of Xoma Drug Study Doesn't Find License Evidence, Dow Jones
News Service, Apr. 14, 1992 (corrected 4/15, 9:38 a.m.).
61. Xoma-FDA Review of E5 ... Says Market Overreacted to News, Dow Jones News
Service, Apr. 15, 1992.
62. IDD Information Services, Tradeline, CUSIP no. G9825R10, available at LEXIS,
Quote Library.
63. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1996).
64. Xoma 1, 856 F Supp. at 563 n.1; Phillip E. Nalborne, Xoma Corp. Remains Confident
FDA Will Approve E5 Drug, Dow Jones News Service, May 5, 1992.
65. Xoma Says FDA May Require Added Clinical Testing of E5, Dow Jones News Ser-
vice, June 4, 1992.
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sufficient efficacy "'66 Xoma's stock, which had rebounded to close at 20
on June 3, fell to 15 1/4 the next day.67 On June 11, Xoma announced it
would give the FDA additional information and analyses from clinical
studies, but acknowledged that "there can be no assurance that the FDA
will license E5 on the basis of the already-completed studies or on the
basis of any additional clinical trials."6
Shareholders sued, claiming Xoma had misrepresented the facts
from March 2 through June 3. The district court granted the company's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that:
Plaintiffs do not allege that any of Defendants' statements are
false. Rather, Plaintiffs contend that the statements are mislead-
ing because they imply that FDA approval is imminent.
However, Plaintiffs do not point to a single instance where De-
fendants speculated on when FDA approval might come.
Plaintiffs rely exclusively on statements of general optimism,
without alleging any basis for inferring that Defendants did not
genuinely believe, or had no reason to believe, their optimistic
statements. Given that the results of the two Phase III trials were
publicly available, and Defendants repeatedly disclaimed any
ability to predict the actions of the FDA, Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim under the federal securities laws.69
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Like the district court, it characterized
plaintiffs' case as asserting that Xoma had assured the public of E5's
"imminent" approval.7 The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the com-
plaint could stand because plaintiffs alleged "that Xoma knew, based on
its clinical studies, that E5 might not work and would never be approved
by the FDA'
7 1
It is difficult to understand the Ninth Circuit's decision. The opinion
does not cite any Xoma statement that FDA approval was "imminent."
The opinion fails to identify just what facts Xoma allegedly knew-and
concealed-that supposedly showed that E5 did not work. This silence is
66. Scott Wenger, Xoma to Meet with FDA to Review Status of E5 Antibody, Dow Jones
News Service, June 4, 1992; Xoma 11, 74 F.3d at 958.
67. IDD Information Services, Tradeline, CUSIP no. G9825R10, available at LEXIS,
Quote Library; Xomna , 856 F. Supp. at 563.
68. Xona-FDA -2-: FDA Had Said It Might Require Added Testing, Dow Jones News
Service, Jun. II, 1992; see also Xoma II, 74 E3d at 958 (Ninth Circuit said plaintiffs alleged
that this meant approval would be delayed for months or years and that the delay greatly di-
minished Xoma's chances of capturing the sepsis treatment market).
69. Xomna 1, 856 F Supp. at 564.
70. Xoma II, 74 F.3d at 957.
71. Id. at 959.
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particularly troublesome because-even before the Reform Act-
Rule 9(b) required that fraud be pleaded with particularity.72 And well
before Xoma, the Ninth Circuit interpreted that rule to mean that plain-
tiffs in securities fraud cases must allege specifically why a statement
was false.73
Moreover, the Xoma defendants pointed to many qualifying state-
ments the company and its officers had made that expressly disclaimed
any intent to predict when the FDA would approve E5. Xoma's 1O-Q for
the quarter ended September 30, 1991, included this warning:
The Company's liquidity and future financial position will be ma-
terially impacted by both the timing of approval and the ultimate
commercial success of E5 and [another drug]. Both products are
currently under active review with the U.S. Food and Drug Ad-
ministration ("FDA"). The FDA has substantial discretion in the
product approval process and therefore, it is not possible to pre-
dict at what point, or whether, the FDA will be satisfied with the
Company's submissions or whether the FDA will raise issues
which could significantly delay product approvals.74
Both Xoma's April 6, 1992 10-K75 and its May 4, 1992 10-Q 76 con-
tained similar cautions. News stories noted that Xoma's board chairman
voiced like disclaimers.7 7 The defendants argued that these express dis-
avowals entitled them to rely on the "bespeaks caution" doctrine. The
Ninth Circuit simply brushed this defense argument aside."
It is quite possible Xoma would be decided differently today. The
Reform Act requires complaints to "specify... [the] reasons why [each
allegedly false] statement is misleading ' 79 and imposes liability on pre-
dictions only when the speaker had actual knowledge that they were
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
73. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (superseded by
statute to the extent it held that scienter could be pled generally in private lob-5 actions).
74. Xoma Corp., 10-Q Quarterly Report for quarter ending Sept. 30, 1991, at 8. (empha-
sis added).
75. Xoma Corp., 10-K Annual Report for year ending Dec. 31, 1991, at 10.
76. Xoma Corp., 1O-Q Quarterly Report for quarter ending March 31, 1992, at 6.
77. The district court decision quotes a Reuter's April 14, 1992 story as saying that
Xoma's CEO "declined to speculate if or when the drug would be approved by the agency;" a
Dow Jones News Service report of May 5, 1992, as saying that the CEO "didn't speculate on
when approval might come;" and a Reuter's piece on May 15, 1992, as reporting that the CEO
"declined to speculate on if and when the drugs will be approved." Xoma I, 856 F. Supp. 561,
564 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
78. Xoma H, 74 F3d 955, 959 (9th Cir. 1996).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IH 1997).
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false.' Plaintiffs might have been unable to plead specific facts raising a
strong inference that Xoma executives actually knew the FDA would not
approve E5. Moreover, the cautionary language in Xoma's securities fil-
ings might have shielded the company under the Reform Act's first safe
harbor protection. Nevertheless, Xoma suggests three important consid-
erations for companies formulating predictive public statements.
First, rightly or wrongly, the court understood the company's state-
ments to predict imminent FDA approval and, in this respect, to differ
from the long-term prediction in Syntex." Second, Xoma's statements
appeared to be directed at the market and designed to affect the market
price of the stock. The first challenged statement directly refuted a secu-
rities analyst's report. Xoma later stated that the market had
"misunderstood" the significance of FDA action when Xoma's stock
price fell after the FDA found the first Phase II study insufficient to
support product approval. Third, the court may have interpreted Xoma's
statements-taken in the context of the chronology-as excessive "spin
control" The FDA's advice that the first Phase mEI study did not provide
sufficient efficacy evidence was bad news. The company, however, em-
barked on a public effort to erase that impression.
In re Marion Merrell Dow Securities Litigation" is a third case in
which defendants predicted FDA approval. Their statements suggested
that approval of Seldane as an over-the-counter medication was only a
matter of time. They also made a specific prediction, in September 1990,
that the drug would be available OTC sometime in 199 L" The company
allegedly failed to disclose:
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 11I 1997). A company saying an FDA ap-
proval is "imminent" would seem to be making a statement about the future. A recent case
addressing allegations about "imminent" contracts, however, casts some doubt on this proposi-
tion. EP MedSystems, Inc. it EchoCath, Inc., 235 F3d 865, 876 (3d Cir. 2000) holds that an
issuer announcing that certain contracts "were ready to take place" could be found to be mak-
ing "a representation about the current state of negotiations ... rather than a prediction of
future events."
81. See H.A.B. Assocs. v. Hines, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,665, at 98,116 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1990) (denying motion to dismiss securities claims
where defendant "purportedly represented to the HAB partners that he had direct information
that Thermascan would soon be receiving approval from the Food and Drug Administration
... for its unique in-office AIDS test." [emphasis added]).
82. In re Marion Merrell Dow Inc., Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,776 (v.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 1993).
83. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that on January 9, 1990, the chairman said, "once Seldane ... is
approved on a non-prescription basis, the greatest absolute sales growth will continue to be in
prescription drugs:' On May 8, 1990, one individual defendant said that the company was
"working hard ... to be sure that we are ready when we do get the approval:' In September
1990, a company spokesperson said, "Seldane will represent the largest Rx-to-OTC switch in
U.S. pharmaceutical history." The company publicly projected that Seldane would go OTC
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(1) that 773 reactions to Seldane had been reported in England,
including one arrhythmia, one extrasystole, one cardiac ar-
rest,, one report of convulsions and two cases of aggravated
epilepsy.
(2) that on June 11, 1990, the FDA's Pulmonary-Allergy Drugs
Advisory Committee met to discuss the cardiovascular ef-
fects of Seldane and reported that as of June 1990 the FDA
had received 61 reports of adverse Seldane cardiac events,
including 25 that Marion's own personnel acknowledged as
serious cases. At the meeting, Dr. Leslie Hendeles, a mem-
ber of the committee, stated, among other things, that
"obviously, it goes without saying that this is a drug that
could not possibly be over-the-counter for self-
administration."
(3) that by mid-May 1991, Marion had received 47 reports of
serious cardiovascular events in patients taking Seldane.
(4) that by May of 1992, four deaths had been attributed to
Seldane use, and one additional death was attributed to the
use of Seldane with another drug. In addition, Marion had
learned of a significantly greater number of serious cardio-
vascular events in patients taking Seldane, causing Marion
to make even stronger warnings about using Seldane as a
prescription drug.
Plaintiffs' "inference [was] that the defendants knew that there was
little or no chance the FDA would approve Seldane for OTC status, but
that the defendants continued to make statements that approval was cer-
tain." 85 The court denied the motion to dismiss even though the 1991
Annual Report stated twice that "there can be no assurance that... ap-
proval will be received from the FDA for the switching of any
prescription product, including Seldane, to OTC status," and despite
statements by an individual defendant that "[w]e will not guess the tim-
ing of the FDA approval" and that "we don't predict the FDA's actions."'"
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court found these to be
sometime in 1991. On February 26, 1991, an individual defendant told financial analysts,
"[T]he anticipated conversion of Seldane to an over-the-counter product potentially represents
the largest prescription-to-OTC switch in pharmaceutical history.' In March or April 1992, he
said that when Seldane switched to the OTC market, it was likely to become "the largest prod-
uct in the OTC marketplace in the United States:' Id. at 97,763.
84. Id. at 97,763.
85. Id. at 97,765.
86. Id. at 97,763; 97,768.
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"generic warning[s] that Marion would provide for any drug," and held it
was "not enough that plaintiffs recognized a risk; rather, given
the plaintiffs' allegations, the statements did not sufficiently warn the
plaintiffs of the magnitude of the risk or the risk factors relevant to
Seldane." 7
More recent decisions dealing directly with undisclosed side effects
clarify that they are not material (or, alternatively, that a company does
not intend to defraud by failing to disclose them) until the adverse reac-
tions are statistically significant." Again, it is uncertain whether In re
Marion Merrell Dow would be decided for plaintiffs today when the Re-
form Act requires specific pleading that a defendant actually knew that
its prediction was misleading when made.
In re Marion Merrell Dow nevertheless illustrates the danger in pre-
dicting FDA approval, even in a careful manner. The company's only
time-specific statement-a prediction in 1990 of OTC status sometime
in 1991-was relatively long-term and imprecise. Its other statements
were, as the court understood them, merely expressions of the com-
pany's belief that the drug would eventually receive over-the-counter
approval. All of these statements should have been relatively low-risk.
Perhaps this case is best understood as one combining both an undis-
closed, and on its face quite discouraging, FDA comment (that the drug
"obviously... could not possibly be over-the-counter for self-
administration") and assumedly undisclosed underlying facts (the extent
of the reported adverse reactions)."' In re Marion Merrell Dow also dem-
onstrates again that plaintiffs can turn a case about an affirmative
forward-looking statement into a case about alleged omissions. As set
out above, plaintiffs have employed this technique on occasion in more
recent cases to elude Reform Act protections.
The SEC recently addressed predictions of FDA approval in an ad-
ministrative proceeding against Zila, Inc. Zila had developed OraTest, a
mouth rinse to diagnose oral cancer.90 In November 1998, the company
announced that the FDA had agreed to review Zila's New Drug Applica-
tion for OraTest, and in December the FDA said that its Oncologic
87. Id. at 97,768.
88. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 R3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000); see also In re Carter-Wallace, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 150 R3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
89. In re Marion Merrell Dow, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
97,763. It is important to remember that this case was decided on a motion to dismiss. The
defendants argued that the allegedly omitted facts had been publicly reported. Id. at 97,769.
The court ruled, however, that the record was not sufficiently developed at the pleading stage
to address such a "truth-on-the-market" defense. Id. at 97,769-70.
90. Zila Admin. Order, supra note 40, Part III.C.1. All facts are from SEC findings,
which respondents neither admitted nor denied in the settlement leading to the order.
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Drugs Advisory Committee (ODAC) would do so at a January 13, 1999
public meeting.9'
On December 10, Zila issued a press release containing financial in-
formation. The release expressed the view that "we expect the committee
will recommend approval of our inexpensive and potentially life-saving
technology.' 92 The company's 10-Q, filed on December 11, contained a
similar statement.93 But around December 28, Zila received a draft copy
of the review the FDA staff had submitted to ODAC, which stated that
Zila's study supporting OraTest was "incomplete, seriously flawed, [and]
of questionable quality." The draft added that, "definitive conclusions
regarding the efficacy of OraTest cannot be drawn "'9 4 The staff opined
that the OraTest NDA was not approvable.
After the company received that draft report, Zila's public relations
spokesperson continued to make optimistic statements about FDA ap-
proval to Zila shareholders, brokers, and the media, without disclosing
the fact and substance of the FDA report." When an analyst initiated Zila
coverage with a sell rating and offered the opinion that OraTest would
have a difficult time until an ongoing clinical trial produced conclusive
results, Zila responded with a statement calling the analyst's report "in-
accurate and misleading."96 Zila's statement referenced two other analyst
reports and asserted that they "more accurately reflect the status of
OraTest. '" 97 Again, Zila did not disclose the FDA staff draft or what it
said.
98
The ODAC voted unanimously against approving OraTest." The
SEC found that the optimistic statements Zila made after receiving the
staff draft violated Rule lOb-5 because they did not tell investors about
the adverse FDA paper1 O
The Zila administrative proceeding is important in three respects.
First, it demonstrates that the SEC itself may pursue life sciences com-
panies for predictions of FDA approval. When the Commission does so,
issuers are not protected by the Reform Act's safe harbor provisions,
which apply only to private actions. Second, Zila illustrates the impor-




95. Id. Part III.C.3.
96. Id.
97. Id. One of those reports said that the analyst was "confident that Zila would obtain
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tance of reviewing the facts in the company's possession each time the
company forecasts FDA approval. Even if the forecast uses the same
language and is surrounded by the same cautions as before, some new
development (such as the receipt of the FDA staff draft in Zila) can make
a forecast inappropriate or require different language or some further
disclosure. Finally, under some circumstances, forecasts can themselves
trigger the obligation to publicly reveal communications with the FDA
staff.
D. Financial Projections Anticipating FDA Approvals
A small step away from express predictions of FDA approval lie fi-
nancial forecasts that assume such approval. Those forecasts may raise
securities law issues if the company possesses material, undisclosed in-
formation seriously undermining the chances that FDA approval will
occur in time to produce the projected results. Two cases-involving
Zenith Laboratories and Sabratek-illustrate this issue.
Plaintiffs survived a motion for summary judgment in In re Zenith
Laboratories Securities Litigation,'0 ' where they alleged the company
expressed confidence that it would exceed the 15-20% annual growth
rate projected for the generic drug industry. More specifically, Zenith
had, in its first quarter 1986 report, forecasted profits from "the introduc-
tion in the second quarter of additional new products which are pending
approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration," and that results for
the year 1986 would "meet or exceed current expectation"' 02 The com-
pany had received a Form 483 from the FDA, however, which apparently
included a long list of problems: selling drugs without approval, chang-
ing the manufacturing or composition of drugs without approval,
absence of data to justify listed expiration dates, failure to validate
manufacturing processes, and neglect of annual drug reviews, equipment
maintenance and record keeping. 3 Zenith did not disclose these FDA
complaints.
A company need not publicize the results of every FDA inspection
the company endures.0 4 In this case, however, the FDA had conducted a
four-month review of Zenith operations, and there were indications that
the Form 483 was significant. One board member testified that he was
I01. In re Zenith Labs. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,617, at 96,814 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 1993).
102. Id. at 96,817.
103. Id. at 96,816.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 217-221.
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"shocked" when he read the FDA report,'0 5 and stock price movement
arguably supported its importance. On July 14, Barron's published an
article, written by an author who had obtained a copy of the Form 483
through the Freedom of Information Act. The article summarized the
deficiencies that the FDA identified, and Zenith's stock price modestly
declined.'O
Although Zenith attacked the Barron's article in a press release, it
announced on August 6 that second quarter earnings would likely drop
by 25-38% from the same quarter the previous year. Plaintiffs alleged
that noncompliance with FDA regulations directly and substantially
caused this financial reversal.'07 The district court denied motions for
summary judgment by a member and former chairman of Zenith's board
and a former vice president of medical affairs.
In contrast to Zenith Laboratories, Sabratek won its securities case,
at least insofar as plaintiffs claimed that financial forecasts improperly
assumed an FDA approval. Sabratek produced flush syringes. While the
syringes had previously been regulated as drugs, the FDA informed Sa-
bratek in April 1997 that the company would have to submit a 501(k)
application for approval of the syringes as a medical device. The com-
pany did so, and while the FDA considered that application, the agency
twice inspected the syringe manufacturing facilities and advised Sa-
bratek that the facilities did not comply with federal regulations. Some
months after the second inspection, the company suspended production
of the syringes for a time, but the FDA ultimately approved a revised
501(k) application.' When shareholders sued Sabratek, their case was
dismissed to the extent that it attacked financial projections the company
made while these events unfolded. The decision recognized that, in the
heavily regulated health care industry, the FDA will sometimes give a
company unfavorable reviews. But this does not necessarily mean the
company must abandon its financial projections.
Simply receiving a number of letters from the FDA listing regu-
latory shortcomings does not portend ultimate FDA denial of the
recipient's application, as demonstrated by the FDA's ultimate
approval of Sabratek's revised 501(k) application .... [T]here is
no basis for the plaintiffs' claim that Sabratek's optimistic finan-
105. See In re Zenith Lab., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,817.
106. The opinion states that Barron's published the article on July 14, 1986. Id. at
96,818. Zenith stock closed at 14-1/4 on Friday, July 11, 1986. It closed down at 13-1/8 on
July 14, 1986, and declined unevenly to 10-1/2 by the close of trading on August 6, 1986. Id.
at 96,824.
107. Id. at 96,818.
108. Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F Supp. 2d 827, 831 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
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cial predictions were unreasonable in light of the FDA's actions
regarding the flush syringes.'"
Sabratek represents a more realistic view than In re Zenith. Imposing
liability when financial predictions go unrealized because the FDA did
not approve new products on the schedule the predictions assume is of-
ten unfair because FDA approval is so unpredictable. Even if a company
is experiencing some regulatory difficulty with the agency when it makes
predictions, it may be unclear at the time whether that difficulty will de-
rail or significantly slow new licenses. Sabratek was a Reform Act case.
Zenith was not. Hopefully, the Act will prompt courts to focus on, and
critically evaluate, specific facts behind claims that a life sciences com-
pany knew, when it predicted FDA approval of a particular product at an
identified time, that regulatory issues would frustrate that prediction.
It is important to note, however, that financial projections cases may
be characterized as omission, rather than misrepresentation, cases. The
In re Zenith court saw that case in part as one in which the defendants
failed to disclose FDA problems, including the Form 483. As with cases
involving express predictions of FDA approval, courts may determine
that an omission analysis is unaffected by the Reform Act's protections
for "forward-looking statements."
E. Final Thoughts on Predictions of FDA Approval
Considered together, the FDA prediction decisions prompt three
final comments. First, courts generally should and likely will give
companies considerable leeway in predicting agency approval. The
decisions of government bureaucracies, like the FDA, are inherently
difficult to predict." ° While courts will give more latitude to companies
109. Id. at 835. It is difficult to tell from the opinion exactly what financial projections
Sabratek made. It is also worth noting that the complaint cited newspaper articles about the
warning letters from the FDA. Id. at 834. The regulatory problems at the syringe manufactur-
ing facilities must have been publicly known.
110. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the great difficulties in predicting regulatory ac-
tions, albeit in a different context. In Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F3d 1136, 1141-
42 (9th Cir. 1996), the court observed that:
[R]eliance on predictive statements in the context of regulatory proceedings is in-
herently unreasonable. Basing an investment decision on an anticipated and
contingent outcome of a litigated regulatory proceeding, even with full knowledge
of the prior history of the parties, is tantamount to sheer speculation; and guessing
wrong hardly suggests fraud.
Accordingly, an investor who relies on such information cannot be said to be misled
by an "untrue statement of material facts' [Citation omitted]. The context of the
regulatory process does not ordinarily invoke a duty to disclose or provide a basis
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predicting approval farther out in time, even companies making shorter-
term predictions should be able to avoid liability, unless the company
acts in a manner that raises the court's suspicion. In Xoma, the
company's very direct campaign to support the price of its stock by
publicly contesting the significance of bad news may have been its
undoing.
Second, courts and the investment community need a deeper under-
standing of the entire FDA approval process. Biotechnology is based on
science and, to the lay person, science suggests certainty. Yet certainty
may be unattainable in biotechnology reality. A company may undertake
tests designed to show the effectiveness of a drug over a large patient
population, only to find that the tests do not show efficacy for that popu-
lation as a whole, but may show a statistically significant positive effect
on a subset of the patients in the clinical trial. Interpretation of the test
results may be a matter of judgment and different reviewers may hold
differing opinions, each of which is reasonable. All of this adds uncer-
tainty in the scientific sense which, added to the unpredictability of
bureaucratic decisions, compounds the difficulty of forecasting FDA ac-
tions. The section of this article discussing disclosure of test results
suggests an approach that may help courts and companies wrestle with
this problem.
Third, drug and medical device manufacturing businesses engage in
a near-constant dialogue with the FDA. A communication from the FDA
that criticizes the company may simply be a part of that dialogue. The
fact that plaintiffs' lawyers later seize upon that communication does not
necessarily mean the life sciences company erred at the time in conclud-
ing that the letter, comment, or notice raised issues the company could
address successfully without damage to the prospects for, or timing of,
an FDA approval.
II. DISCLOSING TEST RESULTS
Test results can determine whether the FDA grants a license or not.
They can also reveal what patient populations a new product can benefit
and, by extension, the size of the available market for the drug or device.
As a life sciences product proceeds through different stages of its testing,
for a securities fraud claim. Thus, a utility that has announced it has submitted an
application for a rate increase normally has no duty to inform the public of any
facts or circumstances in addition to those set forth in the application.
(emphasis in original).
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the company developing it may wish to comment publicly upon testing
progress.
Such comments pose at least two securities law problems. The first
is how to announce "good" news that test results suggest a product is
safe and efficacious. The second is whether, and when, to reveal "bad"
news, such as that a product's success rate is less than the company
hoped, that its success is limited to a relatively small subset of the pa-
tient population suffering a particular combination of medical problems,
or that a test population is experiencing a harmful side effect at a statisti-
cally significant rate.
A. The Possible Ambiguity of Test Results
Before discussing these issues directly, it is important to acknowl-
edge that even experts can find test results difficult to interpret. Two
researchers or evaluators looking at the same test results sometimes
reach different conclusions. The FDA recognizes this fact. In explaining
to Congress why the FDA insists that applicants provide all test data to
the agency instead of only summaries, the agency has stated that
summary data has necessarily been processed, and that process-
ing includes interpretation. When data is summarized, a decision
must have already been made to look at it in some particular
way. A review of the actual data provides the opportunity for that
data to be examined and processed by different tests and proce-
dures, and thus may allow the data to reveal information that
would not be evident from the single perspective.'
One district court stated more bluntly:
Medical researchers may well differ over the adequacy of given
testing procedures and in the interpretation of test results"
2
Interpretation of test results is, to a significant degree, an art as well
as a science. There may exist a range of reasonable interpretations. In a
111. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1997: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 512 (1996) (written responses by FDA to questions
from Congresswoman Kaptur).
112. In re MedImmune, Inc. See. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953, 966 (D. Md. 1995), quoted in
Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 420 (5th Cir. 2001), In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 121 (D. Mass. 1999), and In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25,
38 (D. Mass. 1997). See also Padnes v. Scios Nova Inc., No. C 95-1693, 1996 WL 539711 at
*5 n.l (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1996). ("Medical researchers may well differ with respect to what
constitutes acceptable testing procedures, as well as how best to interpret data garnered under
various protocols").
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given case, the life sciences company may be sincerely committed to one
interpretation within that range, which shows product efficacy, while the
FDA might select another interpretation within that range, which shows
that the drug is not effective or at least that the particular test results do
not prove efficacy. Even within a company, different individuals, or even
the same researchers and evaluators at different times, may reach
different conclusions from the same test data." 3 Courts should, therefore,
understand that after-the-fact analyses may not reveal the tests' true
significance and certainly may not accurately reflect the defendants'
interpretation at the time they described test results in a manner allegedly
violating the securities laws."' Critically, if a company's positive
interpretation of clinical tests is within the range of reasonable science,
courts should not find the interpretation "false" within the meaning of
113. In DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F Supp. 2d 1212 (S.D. Cal. 2001), the court
granted a motion to dismiss where plaintiffs, among other things, alleged that statements about
test results made in June and July 1996 were false because they referred to "25 evaluable pa-
tients" whereas a later presentation referred to 22 such patients. Id. at 1228. The court
explicitly recognized that review of data could change the number:
Much occurred in the 18 months that separated the issuance of [the] June 1996
press release and the ODAC meeting in December 1997, including the data cutoff
for the NM clinical trials, further statistical analysis of clinical data, and the filing
of the complete New Drug Application with the FDA. Nothing in the Second
Amended Complaint negates the reasonable inference that the removal of evaluable
patients from the DepoCyt group resulted from subsequent statistical refinements of
the clinical data.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 57 F Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Tex. 1999), reconsid-
eration denied as to other matters, 68 F. Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Tex. 1999), addressed this issue
in the context of a gold mining venture. Plaintiffs sued on the basis that one of defendant's
public statements was misleading because tests the company ran on waste core samples found
no gold content in 130 of the 135 samples. In dismissing the complaint, the court wrote:
In order for the Plaintiffs' theory to survive this motion to dismiss, the allegations in
the complaint must give rise to a reasonable inference that Barrick's awareness of
these negative test results is equivalent to Barrick's learning definitively or reck-
lessly disregarding the fact that there was no gold at Busang. Such an inferential
leap is not supported by the Complaint.... Without more facts from which to draw
reasonable inferences, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to identify ac-
tionable misstatements of Barrick.
McNamara, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 415. In a later opinion, the court found that a further amended
complaint stated a lob-5 claim against Barrick, in part because plaintiffs alleged that Barrick
submitted the test results described above to a mineral sampling expert who concluded that it
was highly improbable that chance or accident could explain the discrepancy between these
results and the high-gold content assay results that the project's developers had submitted to
Barrick. McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,418, at 96,367-68, 96,391-92 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2001).
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the securities laws,"5 should not find scienter and accordingly should not
find a lOb-5 violation if the company publishes its view."6
B. Disclosing Positive Test Results
When test results arrive, they frequently include some good news.
The news may be tempered by limited statistical significance, by now-
apparent problems in study design, or by the fortuitous discovery that a
drug did not demonstrate efficacy against the prospective endpoints but
appears to show promise in other ways. All of these factors enter into a
company's analysis of the results and what the company decides to say
about them.
The company will want to emphasize the positive. But if the drug is
ultimately unsuccessful, or if its licensing suffers delays, shareholders
may question the decision to disclose favorable data. Cases arising from
such circumstances address three issues: (1) disclosure of selected in-
formation about tests; (2) internal company disputes over what test
results prove; and (3) confusion created by the publication of "hard
data."
1. Disclosing Selected Information About Clinical Tests
Absent publication of virtually all documents created in a clinical
trial, every disclosure about such a trial will be limited to the pieces of
information that management elects to disclose. The company may pro-
vide some description of test protocols, but may not supply all details.
While a study may have recorded many different patient variables (from
heart attacks to blood pressure and temperature), and may have meas-
ured multiple "endpoints," the company normally publishes data on only
some variables and may announce the results only as to some endpoints.
Deciding what to disclose is a matter of judgment. Three cases illustrate
how such a judgment may itself later be judged: Padnes v. Scios, In re
PLC Systems, and In re Biogen.
Scios Nova collaborated in a Phase II study of Auriculin-a
proprietary form of atrial natriuretic peptide ("ANP")-a drug to treat
acute renal failure ("ARF"). The study was conducted in Colorado, and
after it was complete, Scios Nova issued a November 16, 1993 press
release stating that the study "demonstrated" that ANP provided a
115. The interpretation of test results is an opinion, and courts should evaluate its truth
or falsity in much the same manner as a forecast. See supra text accompanying note 8.
116. It was precisely on this basis that the court in In re Medlmmune, 873 F. Supp. at
966, found that plaintiffs had not "fairly ple[d] the manner in which Defendants acted with
reckless disregard as to the validity or invalidity of the data."
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statistically significant reduction in the need for dialysis in ARF patients
and increased creatinine clearance.'1 7 Its President/CEO/Chairman said
that Auriculin would reverse the course of acute kidney failure."' Scios
Nova's annual report in March 1994 repeated the representation that the
Colorado study showed a "statistically significant reduction in the
number of patients requiring dialysis."" 9 In May 1995, however, the
company announced that preliminary Phase III results failed to show that
Auriculin reduced dialysis or mortality.'
Shareholders sued, alleging fraud in Scios Nova's reports of the
Phase II results. In particular, they asserted that the company's state-
ments had failed to reveal:
that Auriculin did not increase urine flow rates, that Auriculin
had no substantial effect on glomerular filtration rate or changes
in serum creatinine, that different dosages and routes of admini-
stration were used, that a higher percentage of control-group
patients received vasopressors, that diuretics were not adminis-
tered to control-group patients after the first 24 hours, and that
the difference in the dialysis rates between surviving control-
group and surviving treatment-group patients was not statisti-
cally significant.'
2'
In dismissing the complaint, the court noted the shareholders did not
dispute that Scios Nova's summaries of the Colorado study "were factu-
ally accurate in the sense that they faithfully reported the study's
conclusions.' '2 Instead, the court viewed the complaint as charging that
the company "should have disclosed details of the study which they
characterize as design defects... and should have included different
measurements of the study's outcome than those performed by the Colo-
rado researchers."' 23 The court rejected such claims, recognizing that a
life sciences company cannot publicly report every fact from a clinical
trial, and embracing the notion that a company does not commit fraud so
long as it selects the facts it discloses in a reasonable way:
The securities laws do not impose a requirement that companies
report only information from optimal studies, even if scientists
could agree on what is optimal. Nor do they require that
117. Padnes, 1996 WL 539711 at* 1-2.
118. Id. at *2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at*1.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *5.
123. Id.
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companies who report information from imperfect studies
include exhaustive disclosures of procedures used, including
alternatives that were not utilized and various opinions with
respect to the effects of these choices on the interpretation of the
outcome data.
Defendants, like any other company wishing to publicly discuss
the results of a scientific study, had to make a judgment as to
which specific bits of information about the study and its conclu-
sions to disclose. With the advantage of hindsight, defendants'
judgment as to which information to disclose is subject to chal-
lenge; however, this does not amount to "facts explaining why
the difference between the earlier and later statements is not
merely the difference between two permissible judgments, but
rather the result of a falsehood." [Citation omitted.] The fact that
plaintiffs disagree with the Colorado researchers and with de-
fendants about the import of the Colorado data does not make
defendants' summaries of the study false or misleading. The
court finds that defendants' statements were within the realm of
permissible judgment.
Reasonable minds could differ with respect to the value of the
Colorado study in determining the therapeutic effects of Auri-
culin. Reasonable minds cannot conclude, however, that
defendants'failure to exhaustively catalogue those possibilities
was fraudulent.'24
In re PLC Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation' is a similar case. PLC
reported positive results from clinical tests of its Heart Laser device in
Transmyocardial Revascularization ("TMR"). Plaintiffs criticized one
press release "for stating that 'the TMR data ... confirms that TMR may
124. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that "the Colorado study was published in a
peer-reviewed journal, indicating that specialists in the field believed it had some scientific
value:' Id. at *6. As for Scios Nova's optimistic opinions about the drug-such as its estimate
that it could be used to treat 130,000 patients annually-the court ruled that "neither facts
showing reasonable people could have disagreed with defendants' beliefs nor the mere fact
that the Phase IUl tests were unsuccessful, even when coupled with a list of supposed protocol
defects, amount to allegations that there was no reasonable basis for the opinions which were
expressed" Id. at *6.
See also DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1230 (S.D. Cal. 2001)
(dismissing complaint alleging that press release reporting comparative survival numbers for
company's product versus a competing product for "evaluable" patients was misleading be-
cause, if the company had reported the comparative survival numbers for all enrolled patients,
the comparison would have been less favorable. The court found plaintiffs' suggested reason
for patients dropping out of the evaluable category wholly speculative).
125. In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 1999).
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be an effective therapy' without disclosing the fact that for terminal
patients suffering from unstable angina, TMR appeared to hasten death.
Plaintiffs fault[ed] the same release for not disclosing that the clinical
trial had been designed for 200 (not 100) patients.' ' 26 Dismissing these
claims, the court called them "more quibble than material.'
27
A reasonable investor would be interested in whether TMR
might prove to be an effective therapy for the majority of pa-
tients suffering from end-stage coronary disease without being
overly concerned that it might offer little or no benefit to a small
subset of patients suffering from unstable angina. Similarly,
whether the data was derived from a study of 100 or 200 patients
might interest a medical researcher, but would not be an influen-
tial factor in making an investment decision.'
In re Biogen Securities Litigation29 presented a somewhat different
issue. Biogen developed a drug called Hirulog ("HLOG"), an anti-
clotting agent the company hoped would replace Heparin. The Throm-
bolysis in Myocardial Infarction ("TIMI") office of the National Heart,
Lung and Blood Institute conducted a Phase II study of the drug. The
primary prospectively defined endpoint, called "unsatisfactory outcome,"
included any of four adverse events: (1) death, (2) myocardial infarction
("MI"), (3) failure-of-initial therapy and (4) rapid clinical deterioration.
The study included 24 prospectively defined secondary endpoints. 3
The study failed to show efficacy at any of these endpoints. After
analyzing the data, however, Biogen determined that death or nonfatal
myocardial infarction was less frequent in the group of patients who re-
ceived the higher three doses of Hirulog than in the group receiving the
lowest dose.13' The drug appeared to be effective when evaluated against
this retrospectively defined endpoint.
Biogen's CEO/President stated on January 11, 1994, that the test re-
sults looked "very good" that the company had received "good results
126. Id. at 119.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 119-20. On the other hand, another court might have found that such informa-
tion-possibly including the number of patients in a test, if that number was relevant to
determining the statistical significance of test results-was important to sophisticated inves-
tors or analysts and therefore "material" in the context of an efficient market. See In re Carter-
Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a court could find
statements in technical journals to be made "in connection with" securities transactions and
observing that "[ifn an economy that produces highly sophisticated products, technical infor-
mation is of enormous importance to financial analysts").
129. In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25, 30 (D. Mass. 1997).
130. Id. at 30.
131. Id.
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from the preliminary Phase II trials," and "that given positive clinical
results we have a very large potential market for the drug." All of these
statements were made without saying that the drug showed no efficacy
with respect to the study's primary or secondary endpoints as prospec-
tively defined.' In February 1994, the American College of Cardiology
("ACC") published an abstract that the company approved. The abstract
revealed that the Phase II study had not shown efficacy as to the primary
endpoint, said nothing about the prospectively defined secondary end-
points and stated that "[d]eath or nonfatal MI was significantly reduced
in [patients] treated with HLOG sub2, 3, 4 compared to Lo HLOG at
both hospital discharge.., and at 6 weeks."'33 The abstract did not say
that the reported success was uncovered only by reviewing the data after
the trial had ended and defining a new, retrospective endpoint.
On March 14, 1994, the TIMI Study Office presented the results of
the Phase II study to an ACC conference. The presentation discussed
both the primary endpoint failure and the reduction in the incidence of
death and nonfatal heart attacks. Biogen published a press release on the
same day stating that the company was "encouraged by the results of
[the Phase II study], which showed a significant reduction in death and
heart attacks among patients treated with Hirulog."'m Again, Biogen said
nothing about the secondary endpoints, and the company did not dis-
close that the drug experienced success only as to an endpoint
retrospectively defined. The company planned an expensive Phase In
trial to compare the efficacy of Hirulog to Heparin, but then discontinued
the entire Hirulog program when another Phase I trial, testing Hirulog
for treatment of patients undergoing angioplasty, yielded no positive re-
sults."5
The subsequent securities complaint charged fraud in the January 11,
1994, statement, the February abstract, and the March press release. The
court denied summary judgment as to the January 11 statement because
the positive remarks did not reveal that Hirulog had failed as to the
study's primary endpoint.'36 The court did, however, grant defendants'
motion as to the February abstract and the March press release. The
court found no evidence that the drug's failure with respect to secondary
endpoints was material.'37 As to the failure to disclose that the one suc-
cessful endpoint was retrospectively defined, the court found that
132. Id. at 30-3 1.
133. Id. at 31.
134. Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 30, 33.
136. Id. at 36.
137. Id. at 39.
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"[g]iven the split of expert opinion regarding the importance of prospec-
tively defined endpoints, the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate either
fraudulent intent or recklessness in Biogen's failure to fully publicize the
[Phase II] methodology" '38
As Scios Nova, PLC, and Biogen demonstrate, disclosure of one as-
pect of clinical test results does not mean a life sciences company must
publish all other details of those trials. These holdings accord with secu-
rities decisions from other industries. The rule that a voluntary disclosure
must be complete and accurate "does not mean that by revealing one fact
about a product, one must reveal all others that, too, would be interest-
ing.., but means [that defendants must disclose] only such others, if
any, that are needed so that what was revealed would not be 'so incom-
plete as to mislead.'""
Liability for failing to disclose an aspect of clinical tests should
depend in part on science, recognizing that science often permits
differing judgments in this complicated setting. If it is within the range
of reasonable medical, health care, and statistical science to conclude
that one aspect of test results is important independent of other aspects,
then reporting that one aspect without the others should impose no
securities liability, either because the omitted aspects were not material
or because the reporting company did not intend to defraud by the
selective reporting and was not reckless in creating any misimpression.
138. Id. at 38. The court further observed that:
By all accounts, scientists working for the TIMI office and Biogen were genuinely
enthusiastic about the results of [the Phase H test] with regard to the retrospec-
tively-defined endpoint ... [Dr.] Braunwald [of Harvard Medical School], the
Chairman of the TIMI study... testified that the retrospective scrubbing of clinical
trial data is not only acceptable, but "part of the due diligence in looking at data.'
Braunwald further testified that while death and non-fatal heart attack were not
listed as a pre-specified secondary endpoint, "[d]eath and MI is a very common
analysis. It's one that is clinically, probably the most important one. And that obvi-
ously was one that we used .... In fact, Braunwald believed that the ... trial was
successful "where it mattered" .... The TIMI team, who were not Biogen employ-
ees, felt that way.
Id.
139. Backman v. Polaroid, 910 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1990), quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 E2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (where Po-
laroid disclosed that product was being sold below cost, it did not mislead by failing to say
how much below cost or by failing to report the number of units sold or by failing to state that
sales were below expectations). Obviously, there are limits. See SEC v. Coates, 137 F. Supp.
2d 413, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding misrepresentation where defendant said that "under
an internally supervised test, its [engine] far surpassed the emissions standards imposed by the
[EPA]" but did not address the company's "inability to determine through its in-house tests
whether its engines could comply with EPA or federal requirements without the use of a dy-
namometer" and omitted fact that certain other tests "revealed emission levels that were
substantially higher than the EPA maximums").
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It should also be no violation of the securities laws for a company to
report positive results without reporting what plaintiffs later claim to
have been study design flaws, provided that the company either did not
know of the alleged flaws at the time of the report, or if it was
scientifically and statistically reasonable to believe-on the basis of
what the company knew at the time it spoke-that the results were
meaningful regardless of the alleged flaws. 40 With the Reform Act,
plaintiffs will be required not just to generally state that the reported re-
sults omitted problems in the clinical trials, but also to specify those
problems and plead with particularity how they affected conclusions
from the trials.
41
Life sciences companies should remember, however, that courts may
be troubled if a clinical trial fails as to its prospectively defined primary
endpoint, but results in an announcement that includes a statement that
the trial was in some sense a success without also disclosing the primary
endpoint failure. 142
140. See In re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F Supp. 953, 967 (D. Md. 1995) (dis-
missing complaint based on allegations of test flaws leading to skewed test results, because
"plaintiffs ple[d] no specific facts to show why Defendants knew or should have known this to
be a problem"). In contrast, In re Cell Pathways, Inc. Securities Litigation, [2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,001, at 94,491 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2000), denied a mo-
tion to dismiss where plaintiffs claimed defendants stated that enrollment for a Phase III trial
had been completed, that it was on schedule, and that it could produce data to support an
NDA-all without disclosing that, allegedly, only 34 out of 61 patients who completed the
one-year course of treatment met the criteria for inclusion in the study. At one point, the court
suggests reliance on the notion that "where the alleged fraud relates to the core business of the
company, knowledge of the fraud may be imputed to the individual defendants:' Id. at 94,495,
citing In re Aetna, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 953. But this seems wrong, especially in light of the Re-
form Act's requirement that plaintiffs plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind" 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
At other points, the court suggests that the company acted "recklessly." In re Cell Pathways,
[2000 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,494. The case fails to analyze whether,
at the time of its statements, the company had departed in an extreme way from consensus
precautions to ensure appropriate test patient selection.
141. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001) (plaintiffs alleged that
positive results from Phase I test were misleading because of flaws in those tests; Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed dismissal in part because plaintiffs failed to identify "with any degree of detail
how these shortcomings impacted the trials"). Id. at 419.
142. See In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 120 (D. Mass. 1999)
(refusing to dismiss claim that company violated 10(b) by publishing interim clinical trial
results showing decrease in mortality and angina, but failing to disclose "the fact that the six-
month data showed no significant improvement in perfusion, the study's primary endpoint."
The court found this "troubling, as the absence of any such improvement might signify to a
sophisticated investor that TMR offered no long-term benefit to end-stage patients gener-
ally.').
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2. Addressing Internal Disagreements Over Test Results
Whatever positive, selective disclosure a life sciences company
makes about clinical results, that disclosure will reflect the company's
interpretation of the results. That interpretation will emerge from an in-
ternal company dialogue. During that dialogue, different professionals
may express different views. If so, some views may be rejected after in-
ternal consideration. The inconsistent views may remain in company
files, however, and shareholders may later contend that memoranda,
notebooks, and emails containing those views show that the company's
announced interpretation was "false" and that the company knew, or was
reckless in not knowing, that its interpretation was misleading.
In re Synergen, Inc. Securities Litigation4 demonstrates this prob-
lem. The company conducted Phase II tests of Antril, a drug to treat
sepsis. Synergen's president/CEO and its vice president of clinical re-
search said that Antril "will treat all patients with sepsis syndrome."" A
report to shareholders referenced data "from the Phase II trial that dem-
onstrated a dose-dependent survival advantage in sepsis syndrome
patients treated with ANTRIL.'
45
The patients in Phase II had been divided into four groups receiving,
respectively, a placebo, a low Antril dose, a medium dose and a high
dose.146 The company released a media advisory on November 7, 1991,
stating that, "[B]aseline characteristics were similar among treatment
groups. , 47 After Phase III tests failed to satisfy the FDA's statistical crite-
ria for drug approval, shareholders sued. The court denied the defense's
motion for summary judgment, in part because of the apparently con-
flicting statistical views within the company concerning patient
characteristics in the Phase II tests. At an April 1992 meeting of Syner-
gen's Product and Project Review Committee, the company's
biostatistician discussed imbalances of patient characteristics in the four
Phase H treatment groups. He informed the Committee that:
Another covariate examined was the number of patients with or-
gan dysfunction at entry. Organ dysfunction was defined as one
or more of the following: ARDS, DIC, liver dysfunction or renal
dysfunction. "Normalizing" for these covariates would bring the
level of significance of the outcome by dose effect seen in the
Phase II results to an unacceptable p = 0.062 from p = 0.035.
143. 863 F. Supp. 1409 (D. Colo. 1994).
144. Id. at 1413 (emphasis omitted).
145. Id. at 1414.
146. Id. at 1412.
147. Id. at 1414.
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[The court commented that a "p-value of 0.05 or less renders the
results statistically significant?']
48
A short time later, Synergen's vice president of clinical research sent
a report to the board of directors saying that data
suggested that the placebo patients may have had more severe
sepsis than the three active treatment groups, as measured by
Apache II scores and presence of major organ dysfunction; of
the four groups, the high-dose group was the least severe by
these two important parameters. None of these differences was
statistically significant for the small sample sizes. 149
Synergen's final Phase II integrated report, published December 17,
1993, said that the "treatment groups may be somewhat imbalanced with
respect to the presence or absence of organ dysfunction at study entry,
but not statistically so (p > 0.2) ... [E]ven adjusted for [organ dysfunc-
tion], the level of doses is still a statistically significant predictor of
survival*""5' With all of this (and other) evidence before it, the court de-
cided that the case should go forward because "a reasonable jury could
conclude ... that baseline characteristics of the patients in the various
treatment groups were dissimilar, not similar." '5 The apparent difference
of opinion within Synergen itself helped create the factual question that
permitted plaintiffs to proceed.
In considering what companies may say about test results that can be
interpreted in different ways even within the same company, it is useful
to draw an analogy to financial projections. Courts recognize that the
financial forecasting process often generates differing predictions within
a single company. Decisions acknowledge that corporations routinely
compare different projections, exercise company judgment, and then
reach a corporate decision on the forecast to use for planning purposes,
and, in some cases, to release to the public. Provided that the company
had a reasonable basis for the forecast it adopted, it is not liable for pub-
lishing the one it selects simply because there were other conceivable
forecasts, even other forecasts that were committed to paper within the
corporation.'
148. Id. at 1416.
149. Id. at 1417.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989)
("Any firm generates a range of estimates internally or through consultants. It may reveal the
projection it thinks best while withholding others, so long as the one revealed has a 'reason-
able basis'-a question on which other estimates may reflect without automatically depriving
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Moreover, many courts will no longer accept as legally sufficient a
plaintiff's conclusion that a forecast was false simply because the plain-
tiff alleges that an "internal" memorandum, authored by an unidentified
company staffer for an unspecified audience, reached a different conclu-
sion. Instead, the better-reasoned decisions require plaintiffs to plead the
identity of the author and the recipient, as well as other facts pertinent to
deciding whether the referenced document casts some serious cloud on
the company's ultimate judgment as expressed in its published projec-
tion.
53
The same principle-that a difference of opinion, even among pro-
fessionals, does not indicate fraud-applies to at least some numbers in
financial statements. Certain accounting decisions are a matter of judg-
ment. Courts recognize that a company's accountants may make one
judgment while other accountants would reach a different judgment.
This difference of professional opinion does not show fraud, provided
that the company's chosen accounting treatment falls within the reason-
able options.
154
the published one of foundation."); Freedman v. Value Health, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 317, 332-
33 (D. Conn. 2001) (fact that initial internal forecast predicted a $13 million to $15 million
loss on a contract did not show that $9.6 million estimate in prospectus was false); In re Veri-
Fone Sec. Litig., 784 F Supp. 1471, 1487 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 11 F3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993)
("Plaintiffs must show why the projection disclosed lacked a reasonable basis. The fact that
defendants had contradictory projections available to them cannot, by itself, support an infer-
ence that the disclosed projection was unreasonable at the time it was made."); In re Sybase,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 48 R Supp. 2d 958, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Bell Aft. Corp. Sec. Litig., [1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,467, at 97,113 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997), aff'd,
142 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (internal document predicting 4.8%
growth for 1990 was not considered reliable by management, so this document did not repre-
sent the company's view. Such evidence did not undermine the reasonable basis or good faith
belief for the defendants' projections of 6-9% earnings growth provided by other internal
estimates); In re Caere Corp. Sec. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
153. See supra note 26.
154. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185,205 (1st Cir. 1999); Lovelace v. Soft-
ware Spectrum Inc., 78 .3d 1015, 1021 (5th Cir. 1996), quoting Godchaux v. Conveying
Techniques, Inc., 846 F.2d 306, 315 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of complaint. "[The
fact that Defendants changed auditors because of a difference in judgment about generally
accepted accounting principles does not establish conscious behavior on the part of Defen-
dants. The term 'generally accepted accounting principles,' as we have often noted, is a term
of art encompassing a wide range of acceptable procedures, such that 'an ethical, reasonably
diligent accountant may choose to apply any of a variety of acceptable accounting procedures
when that accountant prepares a financial statement.'"); Lemmer v. Nu-Kote Holding, Inc.,
[Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,604, at 97,538-39 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 6,
2001); In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 131 F. Supp. 2d 680, 701-02 (E.D. Pa.
2001), aff'd, 277 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Miller Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 120 F Supp. 2d
1371, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2000); In re Cirrus Logic Sec. Litig., 946 F Supp. 1446, 1457 (N.D.
Cal. 1996); Mathews v. Centex Telemanagement, Inc., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 9[ 98,440, at 91,037 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 1994); SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F.
Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting judgment for defendants in SEC action where account-
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A similar analysis logically applies to test results. A life sciences
company will analyze those results and, though there may be internal
debate, will reach a corporate view. This view will be reflected in such
decisions as allocation of resources in anticipation of the ultimate licens-
ing of a drug or device. Provided the biotechnology company has a
procedure or process to reach a company judgment on the significance of
test results, and provided that the company follows that procedure or
process to reach a judgment that is within the range of the scientifically
reasonable, the publication of that company interpretation should be pro-
tected from securities law attack. The fact that there are other internal
interpretations, or that company personnel reduced these conflicting in-
terpretations to writing in internal documents, should not render the
company-published view "false" within the meaning of the securities
laws or taint the company with scienter for releasing its view.
This analysis, however, suggests that a company may wish to adopt a
process or procedure for reaching what can truly be called a company
interpretation of test results. It will be helpful in defending a later law-
suit if the company employs some formality in reaching its judgment and
uses the process or procedure consistently.
3. Confusion Created by Publication of "Hard"
Information From Clinical Trials
Assuming that a biotechnology company has completed its internal
analysis of clinical tests, arrived at a company interpretation, and se-
lected the information about the tests that it will release, the company
will almost certainly find that some of that information comprises hard
facts-statistics for groups of patients and the protocols under which the
tests took place. At first blush, it would seem these hard facts, unlike
conclusions that involve interpretation, should raise few disclosure is-
sues. Unfortunately, that is not the case, in part because hard data often
involve technical terms the financial community-including analysts
who profess expertise in life sciences-may not fully understand. The
Synergen, DepoTech, PLC, and MedImmune cases all demonstrate
difficulties arising from disclosure of hard information about positive
test results.
ants differed over residual value for leased equipment. The court held that "this is clearly an
area in which reasonable accountants can differ, and such reasonable disagreements cannot
support an inference of recklessness or fraud." Id. at 1229. The court acknowledged, however,
that lOb-5 recklessness could be found if "the accounting judgments which were made were
such that no reasonable accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted with the
same facts." Id. at 1240.).
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Synergen issued a media advisory on Phase II results reporting that
they showed survival to be a linear function of dose at the p = 0.015
level. The advisory stated in capital letters, that Antril "REDUCES
MORTALITY IN PATIENTS WITH SEPSIS SYNDROME.""' The se-
curities lawsuit against Synergen turned in part on the meaning of
"mortality." There were, in fact, two mortality measures. As the court
explained:
Survival curves measure the number of days a patient lives dur-
ing the 28-day trial. [Citation.] In contrast, "28-day mortality" or
"mortality" refers to the percentage of patients who are dead on
the 28th day of the trial.'
56
The p-value for survival curves was, indeed, 0.015. The p-value for
the percentage dead on day 28 was, however, 0.035.57 Plaintiffs con-
tended that the media advisory was misleading because it suggested that
the 0.015 value applied to the 28-day death measure instead of the sur-
vival curves. Defendants submitted one securities analyst report which
they said showed the investment community understood the 0.015 value
to apply to the survival curves. Plaintiffs submitted a different analyst
report which they said showed the investment community understood the
0.015 value to apply to 28-day mortality.' The court denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was a triable issue
as to the market's understanding of the "mortality" data Synergen pub-
lished.159
DepoTech fared better than Synergen in part because it defined the
terms it used in the documents containing those terms. DepoTech was
testing its drug delivery product, DepoCyt, against a standard chemo-
therapeutic agent, MTX. In a 10-K filing, the company reported interim
clinical trial results showing a 47% "response rate" for DepoCyt com-
pared to 6% for MTX. In a later press release, the company reported a
36% response rate for DepoCyt against 17% for MTX.'60 After an FDA
Advisory Committee declined to recommend DepoCyt's approval and
DepoTech's stock fell, plaintiffs contended in a securities lawsuit that the
10-K and the release misled investors because "response" for purposes
of these disclosures was different from "response" as defined in the
original study protocol. The court dismissed the complaint, in part be-
155. In re Synergen, Inc. Sec. Litig., 863 F. Supp. at 1418.
156. Id. at 1418-19.
157. Id. at 1419.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1226-27 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
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cause the 10-K and release defined "response" as used in the statistics
those documents reported, and the definition of "response" in the origi-
nal protocol had not been publicized at all before the company made the
statements the shareholders challenged. 6'
PLC and MedImmune both concerned the "intention to treat" test
protocol. PLC published interim results showing 6% mortality in the
group provided TMR treatment with the Heart Laser, while the control
group suffered 16% mortality. Plaintiffs challenged the two press re-
leases containing this claim, alleging that the data, in fact, demonstrated
no mortality benefit because certain patients in the control group re-
ceived TMR treatment before they died.'62 Defendants responded that the
statistics, and the clinical trial itself, employed the "intention to treat"
protocol, which accounted for patients according to their initial treatment
assignment regardless of whether they received some cross-over treat-
ment during the study. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss
this part of the case, finding the defense argument depended on materials
outside the scope of the pleadings, such as scientific articles and texts.' 63
Medlmmune developed a drug called Respivir to prevent respiratory
syncytial virus ("RSV"). After the FDA's Blood Products Advisory
Committee voted against recommending approval for the drug, the com-
pany's stock lost almost two-thirds of its value. Shareholders sued.
Plaintiffs pled that the company had endorsed an article in the New
England Journal of Medicine stating that a Respivir study used the "in-
tention to treat" protocol. Plaintiffs alleged that the protocol required the
study to follow all patients who enrolled, even those who did not com-
plete the course of treatment, whereas, plaintiffs contended, the Respivir
study did not include the outcomes of 17 patients who dropped out.'"
Denying the defense's motion to dismiss this claim, the court found that
the public statement about the study's protocol might have misled inves-
tors by suggesting the trial results were more meaningful than they were:
According to Plaintiffs (as well as the Advisory Blood Products
Committee), the absence of reliable, outcome data on those 17
dropouts would make it impossible to determine which of the
children experienced RSV LRI and which did not and might
therefore bias the result. An investor sophisticated enough either
to know the meaning of "intention to treat" or to inquire about it
could arguably have been led to believe that, since the principle
161. Id. at 1227-28.
162. In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 118 (D. Mass. 1999).
163. See id.
164. In re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953, 968 (D. Md. 1995).
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had reportedly... been utilized, the statistical dependability of
the study was better than it in fact was.1 65
Companies can take at least four steps to avoid securities lawsuits
based on the publication of hard data. First, after a company decides
what necessarily limited information about a test it will release, the
company should scrutinize its announcement to be sure it sufficiently
describes that limited information. Synergen might have avoided a law-
suit or won its motion for summary judgment if it had defined what it
meant by "mortality" in the advisory it released, just as DepoTech pre-
vailed on its motion to dismiss by defining in its contested documents
the "response" that those documents reported. PLC might have avoided a
challenge to the press releases publicizing a mortality benefit by stating
that the rates in the treatment and control groups were computed on an
"intention to treat" basis and describing that protocol.
Second, one person within the company should be responsible for
reviewing, prior to their release, all written public statements summariz-
ing test results for any particular life sciences product. Companies
should select a reviewer who has studied the test results and protocols,
and who is familiar with clinical testing and the statistical analysis of
such tests. That individual should have real authority and the strength of
personality to wield it.
Third, any members of management who must make oral presenta-
tions about test results or provide real-time answers to questions about
such results should be armed with precise language. If asked a question
or otherwise prompted to make a comment not covered by the pre-
approved language, they should make every effort to decline to answer
off-the-cuff and to follow up after the company can study the question
and carefully phrase an appropriate answer.
In executing this third step, however, management must be careful
not to violate the rule against "selective disclosure," which prohibits dis-
closing material information to some market participants without
simultaneously providing the information to enough other participants so
that it can be said to be public.'O Consider, for example, the biotechnol-
ogy executive who is confronted in a quarterly conference call with an
unanticipated question about test results. Following the recommendation
set out above, the executive will decline to provide a definitive answer.
He may wish, however, as a matter of courtesy and good relations, to
contact the particular analyst who asked the question and provide an an-
165. Id.
166. Regulation FD specifically prohibits selective material disclosures. 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100 (2001).
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swer after the conference call has been completed and the company has
had time to study the question and prepare a response. But if that re-
sponse provides "material" information, the executive should not
disclose that information solely to the one analyst. Instead, some other,
broader dissemination will be necessary, e.g., by filing a Form 8-K or
disseminating the information "through another method (or combination
of methods) ... that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-
exclusionary distribution... to the public."' 67
Finally, if a company becomes aware of analyst reports or other me-
dia stories that provide inaccurate "hard facts" about tests, the company
may wish to publicly correct the inaccuracy. The securities laws gener-
ally do not require that a company make such corrections,' but in some
circumstances the company may be better able to defend a later lawsuit
if it publicly corrects the error. Moreover, as a practical matter, plaintiffs
in a later lawsuit will attempt to establish that the company was some-
how responsible for the public confusion.'69
If the company learns of the inaccuracy before the report or story is
published, the company may wish to contact the analyst or reporter.
However, a life sciences company must carefully evaluate this decision
with counsel in each instance. If a company contacts a single analyst to
correct an error, the company risks violating the prohibition against se-
lective disclosure.7 If a company provides corrections before
167. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e).
168. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1980); VII
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3523 & n.175 (3d ed. 1989)
("Normally... the mere presence of rumors or of publicly circulating inaccuracies concerning
the issuer does not require a response from the issuer."); Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d
286, 288 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The securities laws require General Physics to speak truthfully to
investors; they do not require the company to police statements made by third parties for inac-
curacies, even if the third party attributes the statement to General Physics:'); In re Polaroid
Corp. Sec. Litig., 134 F Supp. 2d 176, 184 (D. Mass. 2001) ("Mhe First Circuit has not rec-
ognized such a broad duty to rectify incorrect statements made by analysts in the
marketplace").
169. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[E]ven if
statements by [the issuer] or its investment bankers were garbled by the press, [the issuer]
would not be privileged to sit by and allow investors to be misled by the garble.").
170. The issuer again must bear in mind Regulation FD, which prohibits selective dis-
closure. See 17 C.FR. § 243.100 (2001) and text accompanying supra note 167. If the story is
authored by a member of the press, as opposed to a securities analyst, the issuer can privately
make the correction without running afoul of FD. FD is not intended to interfere with disclo-
sures to the media. 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,719-20 (2000). If the report is authored by a
securities analyst, the decision to correct by a private pre-publication contact is more complex.
If the company is confident that the analyst has not communicated the inaccuracy to others
and is confident that others in the investment community have not made the same mistake,
then the company may discuss the matter with the analyst alone. If the company does not have
2001-2002]
160 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 8:115
publication, plaintiffs may later argue that the company so "entangled"
itself in the article or story as to be legally liable for the statements in
it.' If a company provides corrections after publication, plaintiffs may
argue that the company thereby assumed a "duty to correct" and that the
company later violated that duty by failing to correct a subsequent article
or report.
C. Disclosing Negative Test Results
Turning from favorable test results that a company wishes to publi-
cize to results that appear, at least initially, to be unfavorable, such "bad"
results raise two principal disclosure questions. The first is: when does
the company possess "material" information for purposes of the securi-
ties laws? The second is: when, after the company has material
information, does it have a duty to disclose?
1. When Negative Results Become Material
The first question is complicated by the frequent ambiguity of test
results. The results may on first analysis suggest that the new drug or
medical device does not produce the desired effect. Additional analysis,
however, may suggest or demonstrate that the drug or device is effica-
cious against certain medical problems or with limited sets of patients
who have particular combinations of medical problems or as to end-
points only retrospectively defined. It may take a company some time to
review the data sufficiently in order to form a company view of what the
data reveals.
Accepted authority defines a fact to be "material" if it "would have
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable share-
holder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information
made available."
72
such confidence, then a one-on-one communication with the analyst may constitute a prohib-
ited selective disclosure under FD, and the issuer may decide to correct by a public statement.
171. See Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163 (issuer not liable for analysts' projections because the
company "did not place its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the analysts' projections,"
but acknowledging that "a company may so involve itself in the preparation of reports and
projections by outsiders as to assume a duty to correct material errors").
172. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (employing the same definition in section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 analysis).
Apart from materiality, a life sciences company will only be liable if the plaintiffs can
show reliance and loss causation. As a practical matter, this will depend, in a fraud on the
market case, on whether plaintiffs can show that the stock price was affected by the issuer's
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In applying this definition to a life sciences company reviewing test
results, courts would do well to analogize again to financial projections
and reports. A considerable number of cases have held that companies
have no duty to disclose financial figures or projections when the infor-
mation available to the company is incomplete or where the company's
analysis is still tentative and subject to further review. 73 Similarly, bio-
technology companies evaluating ambiguous test results should be given
time to complete their evaluation. Before a company has sufficiently
studied the test results to determine what they mean, the company quite
arguably does not have "material" information to reveal.
Courts already employ this principle to the disclosure of adverse side
effects for drugs approved by the FDA. In these cases, it is only when the
incidence of an important side effect becomes statistically significant
failure to disclose negative results. See Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 414-15 (5th
Cir. 2001). But how the stock will move can only be known reliably after the fact. "Materiality
... looks to likely potential. Reliance, on the other hand, ultimately looks to what actually
happened' Id. at 418. (emphasis in original).
173. While many of these decisions speak in terms of "duty to disclose" or scienter, the
same analysis should apply to determine materiality. In In re HealthCare Compare Corp.
Securities Litigation, 75 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1996), plaintiffs argued that a company's statement
of comfort with analyst earnings estimates was fraudulent because of an internal memoran-
dum. Among other things, the court found it significant that plaintiffs failed to plead that the
figures in the memorandum were final. "The complaint fails to allege even a single fact rele-
vant to the certainty or finality of these figures; nothing in the complaint belies the possibility
that the figures reported in the memorandum were subject to revision or verification before
they could be made public." Id. at 283. See also In re Convergent Technologies See. Litig.,
948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th
Cir. 1980) ("'There is no evidence ... that the estimates were made with such reasonable
certainty even to allot' them to be disclosed to the public. "); Wielgos v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989), citing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271,291-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) ("firms need not disclose tentative
internal estimates, even though they conflict with published estimates, unless the internal
estimates are so certain that they reveal the published figures as materially misleading"); Fi-
nancial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. 91,422, at 96,424 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2001); Fitzer v. Security Dynamics Technolo-
gies, Inc., 119 F Supp. 2d 12, 39 (D. Mass. 2000); In re Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 876 F. Supp. 870, 892-93 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Wright v. International Business Machines
Corp., 796 F Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 747 F Supp.
1136, 1139-40 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 944 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1991) (unpublished table deci-
sion) ("[I]t is not enough that defendants were 'in possession of' data which called a forecast
or opinion into question; for defendants to be liable under section 10(b) ... they must have
assimilated and comprehended the significance of that information to the forecast and inten-
tionally failed to disclose it, or they must have recklessly avoided assimilating and
comprehending the information:').
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that the information about it becomes material under the securities
laws. '7
2. When a Company Must Disclose Material Negative Results
Assuming that a company has completed its evaluation and that the
analysis contains significant "bad news," the next question is when the
company must reveal it. This involves the "duty to disclose," for a com-
pany cannot be liable for failing to publicize a fact-even a material
fact-unless the company has an obligation to disclose it.
75
Two principal events that may create a duty to disclose nonpublic
material facts in this context are:
174. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2000) (plaintiffs alleged a drug
manufacturer failed to disclose that weight-loss drugs caused heart-valve damage. "Because
the link between the two drugs and heart-valve disorders was never definitively established
during the relevant period even after the withheld data is taken into account, AHP's failure to
disclose this data cannot render its statements about the inconclusiveness of the relationship
materially misleading."); see also In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 E3d 153, 157 (2d
Cir. 1998) ("Drug companies need not disclose isolated reports of illnesses suffered by users
of their drugs until those reports provide statistically significant evidence that the ill effects
may be caused by-rather than randomly associated with-use of the drugs and are
sufficiently serious and frequent to affect future earnings."). See later decision affirming
dismissal of case, 220 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000).
175. Private plaintiffs most frequently sue under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, SEC Rule lOb-5, and sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933. The SEC can sue in district court or initiate administrative proceedings under any of
these statutes and a number of others, particularly section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.
In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980), the Supreme Court held in a lOb-
5 case that "one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so." (emphasis added). See also
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) ("Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is
not misleading under Rule lOb-5."); In re Northern Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d
446, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Plaintiffs cite no case in which a company has been held to be
generally obligated to disclose internal problems merely because those problems were poten-
tially significant. Indeed, courts generally do not impose a duty to disclose in such
circumstances:').
Presumably, the same principle applies to section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which is phrased
in nearly identical language as Rule lOb-5. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994) and 17 C.ER.
§ 240.10b-5 (2001). See also, e.g., SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986) (ap-
pearing to require a "duty to disclose" in an omissions case under either section 17(a) or
section 10(b)).
Section 11 of the 1933 Act imposes liability for omissions (and hence enforces a "duty to
disclose") only if the defendant failed "to state a material fact required to be stated [in the
registration statement] or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading... "' 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). Section 12(a)(2) similarly creates liability for failure to disclose in a
prospectus only where the defendant does not reveal "a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading.' 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (Supp. MI 1997).
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i) trading in the biotechnology company's stock by the com-
pany or its principal officers or its directors; '76 or
ii) statements by the company (including officers speaking for
it) that mislead unless the company also reveals the negative
test results.'"
The first of these events presents a bright line test: a company can
easily determine when it is buying or selling its own stock and, in most
cases, should be able to determine when its principal officers or its direc-
tors buy or sell. In either case, a company having material information
about "bad" test results should publicly disclose that information before
the trades occur.
The second disclosure trigger is somewhat more difficult to apply.
But in a case where a life sciences company has reached a conclusion
that test results on a new product are negative, it may, as a practical mat-
ter, be difficult to provide any progress report on the product to the
investment community that fails to include this "bad" news without the
report being arguably incomplete or misleading.
78
Walsingham v. Biocontrol Technology, Inc.17 9 makes this point. Bio-
control was developing a noninvasive device to monitor blood glucose
levels. The complaint alleged that the company failed to disclose unfa-
vorable test results while touting the effectiveness of the device and
176. Corporate insiders labor under a duty to "disclose or abstain"--i.e., they must pub-
licize the undisclosed material facts they know or forbear from buying or selling the
company's securities. Chiarella, 485 U.S. at 227. The same rule applies when the company
itself is buying or selling its own securities. McCormick v. Fund American Companies, Inc.,
26 F3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994).
To be analytically precise, where the only trading is by the individual officer or director,
the duty to disclose material nonpublic information before trading is his alone and not trans-
ferable to the corporation. In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F3d 394, 403 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1106 (1998); Anderson v. Abbott Lab., 140 F. Supp. 2d 894,
909-10 (N.D. 111. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Gallagher v. Abbott Lab., 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir.
2001); Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. Civ. 96-1514 PHX RCV, 1998 WL 1018624, at *20 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998). As a practical matter, the company may wish to consider disclosure if its
directors or top management are going to trade. The company has an interest in avoiding the
adverse public and regulatory reaction to improper insider trading by those closely affiliated
with it.
177. Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and Rule lOb-5 all expressly impose li-
ability for omitting material facts "necessary" "to make the statements" that are made "not
misleading" Moreover, under section 10(b), cases hold that "[w]hen a corporation does make
a disclosure-whether it be voluntary or required-there is a duty to make it complete and
accurate' See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (Ist Cir. 1987).
178. Putting aside securities law liability, a life sciences company may wish to promptly
release such negative news in order to maintain its credibility with analysts and investors.
179. Walsingham v. Biocontrol Tech., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 669 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
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expressing optimism about FDA approval. In denying the defense mo-
tion to dismiss, the court noted the plaintiffs' specific allegations:
For example, on December 6, 1995, BICO issued a statement in
response to a recent newspaper article reporting skepticism as to
whether the Diasensor 1000 would be approved by the FDA.
BICO stated:
If the device does not work, why struggle so hard to get it
to market? Why struggle so hard and long through the FDA
approval process and why would eight of the world's lead-
ing endocrinologists have gone to the FDA to support the
Diasensor 1000TM and urge its approval? The Company
will not survive if a product that doesn't work is supplied.
Biocontrol will maintain the strictest standards with the
Diasensor 1000 Tm noninvasive glucose sensor and will cer-
tainly stand behind the product. The welfare of the diabetic
is of the utmost importance.
Compl. at para. 50. The plaintiff alleges that at the time of this
and other such positive representations, BICO's test results were
dismal. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that
BICO initially evaluated 85 patients[. I]t excluded 22 of
these from the analysis, however, because of machine
malfunctions. It excluded an additional 16 patients because
the machines could not be calibrated to the patient's
physiology (making it impossible to obtain an accurate
blood-glucose reading) and while this left 47 patients, BICO
used only a subgroup of 23 patients for its testing at I three
sites over a month period .... BICO considered the device
"successful" if, with the patient doing the readings, the
Diasensor device produced readings which more than 50%
of the time agreed, within 20%, with the readings from the
patient's own invasive device. Notwithstanding the flawed
nature of the testing, only 8 of the 23 patients monitored
using the Diasensor device obtained results which BICO
deemed to be "successful" when compared to conventional
test methods. The Diasensor 1000 misread glucose levels so
often that it could endanger patients.
Compl. at para. 29.so
180. Id. at 676-77 n.7.
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In rejecting the defense argument that the company had no duty to
disclose these test results, the court found it "significant that the defen-
dants' failure to disclose the test results occurred during a time when
they were issuing what can only be described as very positive press re-
leases, one of which was in response to public criticism of the
[device]."''
It is interesting that the company comments in Walsingham did not
specifically describe the product's performance. Indeed, they were
phrased largely as rhetorical questions. Walsingham emphasizes that any
comment by a life sciences company that even implies effective per-
formance may later result in litigation if the company does not
simultaneously disclose negative test results that have not been super-
ceded by positive ones.
D. Insider Trading Based on Unpublished
Test Results and FDA Approvals
This article focuses primarily on the liability of companies and ex-
ecutives in private lawsuits. But the SEC also brings actions against
biotechnology professionals who trade while in possession of undis-
closed test information.'82 The Commission has also pursued such
actions against insiders who trade after learning of an FDA product ap-
proval, but before the company or the agency publishes that approval' 3
or after learning of a nonpublic delay in an FDA submission.' 4
181. Id. at 677-78.
182. See SEC Litigation Rel. No. 15509, 1997 SEC LEXIS 1997 (Sept. 25, 1997) (an-
nouncing SEC insider trading lawsuit against, among others, a clinical investigator and a
member of a company's scientific advisory board for allegedly purchasing, or tipping others to
purchase, the company's stock while in possession of nonpublic positive test results). See also
SEC Litigation Rel. No. 15322, 1997 SEC LEXIS 773 (Apr. 10, 1997) (announcing SEC
insider trading cases based on allegation that the lead investigator on a clinical trial and his
assistant tipped others to sell stock while knowing unfavorable, but nonpublic, clinical test
results); SEC Litigation Rel. No. 15905, 1998 WL 655577 (Sept. 24, 1998) (discussing set-
tlement of case).
183. See SEC Litigation Rel. No. 16199, 1999 WL430865 (June 29, 1999) (announcing
SEC lawsuit against former controller of Trimedyne and two family members who bought
company stock after allegedly learning that FDA approval to market a medical laser was "im-
minent"); see also SEC Litigation Rel. No. 16198, 1999 WL 430867 (June 29, 1999)
(announcing insider trading case against a lawyer for Trimedyne, retained to represent com-
pany in a product liability lawsuit, who allegedly bought Trimedyne stock after learning from
a company employee that the FDA had cleared Trimedyne to market the laser but before the
company publicly disclosed the clearance).
184. SEC Litigation Rel. No. 15721, 1998 WL 199201 (Apr. 24, 1998) (announcing fil-
ing and settlement of an action against an independent consultant who allegedly purchased put
options on the stock of a client after the consultant obtained nonpublic information regarding
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III. DISCLOSING FDA ACTIONS AND DISCLOSING
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE FDA
In the course of testing and license application, life sciences compa-
nies communicate with the FDA. The agency may not only talk to and
write to the company, but it may also take official action by approving
test protocols and changes in those protocols. The company may wish to
report at least some of these communications and actions, and may be
required to do so. Following these disclosures, analysts and investors
will want to know what the FDA actions and communications mean for
the probability and timing of licensing. They may press the company for
its views. But the iterative nature of the licensing process and the unpre-
dictability of agency action can make it difficult to decode the
significance of what the FDA says and does. While life sciences compa-
nies will internally intuit the agency's rationale and motive, "reading the
tea leaves" in public may be perilous.
Reported decisions evaluate: (1) company disclosure (and nondisclo-
sure) of FDA questions about and comments on clinical tests;
(2) company interpretation of pre-approval FDA actions; and
(3) company statements following FDA denial of a drug or device appli-
cation.
A. FDA Questions and Comments About Tests
By letter or comment, FDA staff or Advisory Committee members
may express a view, sometimes a negative one, about clinical tests. This
will form part of an ongoing dialogue about the tests between the agency
and the company. When the FDA makes adverse comments about tests, a
life sciences company must decide what, if anything, to say publicly
about those comments. This problem becomes acute when the company
announces positive test results. At that point, management must decide
whether the FDA comments are material and whether the company's
positive report on the tests may be misleading if the company does not
give at least some warning of the FDA position.
MedImmune provides critical guidance. The company positively re-
ported Phase Ill test results for its Respivir drug to treat RSV LRI. In a
November 1993 press release, MedImmune said that the publication of
an article on the clinical trial "underscores the potential value of [the
drug] in preventing RSV disease" and that the study showed high-dose
Respivir "significantly reduced the severity of RSV and significantly
the company's plans to delay its application for FDA approval of a personal hemodialysis
system).
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reduced the frequency of RSV-related hospitalizations."'" 5 An FDA Advi-
sory Committee voted against recommending approval of the drug the
next month and "expressed a concern about the concentration of treat-
ment response at the Denver site, as well as the enrollment procedure
used there, which they believed might have compromised random as-
signment of trial participants to treatment groups."'" 6 Shareholders
alleged in a lawsuit that the FDA had raised questions about study design
and had suggested that there were problems with randomization as early
as August, and that the company had violated the securities laws by not
revealing these facts."7 The court dismissed the case insofar as it was
based on the defendants' "enthusiasm 'about the results from this study
and the implications for preventing this serious illness.' """ Consistent
with the notion that expressing views within the range of the scientifi-
cally reasonable does not evince scienter, the court reasoned that
MedImmune had a genuine and defensible view that the test results were
valid:
[W]hatever may be Plaintiffs' claim as to the theoretical invalid-
ity of the test data, their complaint falters on the matter of
scienter which, in the context of this suit, "refers to a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.' ...
Plaintiffs have pleaded no facts, beyond mere conclusory state-
ments, that would support either an inference of bad faith or an
inference that Defendants acted with an intent or recklessly to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud ....
Nor do Plaintiffs fairly plead the manner in which Defendants
acted with reckless disregard as to the validity or invalidity of
the data. Medical researchers may well differ over the adequacy
of given testing procedures and in the interpretation of test re-
sults.... Simply to aver that the Advisory Committee, based on
theoretical (not to say inappropriate) statistical concerns, eventu-
ally challenged the company's opinion, is not to say that
185. hz re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F Supp. 953, 963 (D. Md. 1995).
186. Id. at 958.
187. Id. at 959 (following the Advisory Committee decision, "a staff fellow in the same
FDA office [of Blood Research and Review] ... reportedly told [a biotech trade publication]
that the FDA had been warning MedImmune 'for a long time' about problems with the study
design, suggesting that there could have been problems with randomization 'as early as Au-
gust, when a letter was sent out asking for more information. [She] is reported to have further
stated that Medlmmune appeared to understand FDA's position and simply disagreed." Id.).
188. Id. at 967.
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Defendants should have had knowledge of the theoretical statis-
tical limitations on their assumptions. 189
Speaking directly to plaintiffs' argument that questions from FDA
staffers should have alerted the company to the invalidity of the tests and
that the company should have reported the FDA questions to the invest-
ing public, the court emphatically disagreed.
Mere questioning by the FDA imposed no duty upon Defendants
either to trim back their opinions as to the efficacy of the drug or
to report to the public the FDA staffers' questions as they arose.
Continuous dialogue between the FDA and the proponent of a
new drug is the essence of the product license application proc-
ess.... Requiring ongoing disclosure of FDA's questions would
not only be disruptive to the review process; it could easily result
in misleading the public more than not reporting the questions.
Where mere disclosure of a question might cause the company's
stock to decline in value, the eventual answer to the question
might cause it to rise once again. Investors who sold that stock
when the FDA's question was asked but before the company's
answer was given might have legitimate cause for concern when
a satisfactory answer came forth and the stock's price began to
climb again. As defense counsel cogently argues, Defendants
might then find themselves defending the opposite of the present
lawsuit. ,'O
The court denied the motion to dismiss, however, as to a Medlm-
mune statement that there was "absolutely no question about efficacy."
This statement went too far because it "might well contain in its sweep a
representation that the FDA had raised no question about the efficacy of
the drug [before the Advisory Committee decision] when in fact quite
possibly it had*"' 91
Contrast this lawsuit to In re Marion Merrell Dow.' 92 There the com-
pany made public statements suggesting the FDA would approve a drug
for OTC sale. The court denied a motion to dismiss the claim that those
statements misled, because Marion Merrell Dow allegedly did not also
disclose adverse reactions by some patients or the comment by one Ad-
visory Committee member that "obviously, it goes without saying that
this is a drug that could not possibly be over-the-counter for self-
189. Id. at 966-67.
190. Id. at 966.
191. Id. at 967.
192. See supra notes 82-89.
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administration."' 93 Note that this Committee member comment, however,
was considerably stronger than the implied criticism of test protocol in-
ferred from the staff inquiries in MedImmune.
'Iwo other cases-Biogen and British Biotech-help to refine the
analysis. After Biogen retrospectively determined that Hirulog reduced
death and nonfatal heart attacks and decided to proceed with a Phase III
trial, Biogen representatives met with the Director of the FDA's Gastro-
intestinal & Coagulation Drugs Division. The Director warned that the
absence of a statistically significant link between Hirulog and the pro-
spectively defined primary endpoint in the Phase II trial "raises concern
regarding the efficacy of [the drug]"9' Nevertheless, the FDA encour-
aged Biogen to perform a Phase Ill clinical trial to compare Hirulog
against Heparin in the treatment of unstable angina. ' When Biogen is-
sued its press release announcing Hirulog's apparent success against the
retrospectively defined endpoint and the company's intention to under-
take the additional Phase Im trial, Biogen did not mention the FDA
Director's observation. While the plaintiffs in the subsequent securities
lawsuit claimed that this was fraud, the court ruled that the company
"had no duty to disclose [those] reservations" 96
An SEC investigation and administrative proceeding against British
Biotech concluded quite differently. 7 British Biotech sought FDA
approval to test a new cancer drug. The company told the FDA that the
test would record the effect of the drug on cancer antigens, which the
test would use as surrogate markers for tumors-thereby assuming that
the antigen levels bore some relationship to the growth of the tumors. 9
British Biotech also indicated that it would later conduct definitive trials
that would rely on traditional markers for efficacy, such as mortality
rates and X-ray or CT scan measurements of tumor size.'99 In March
1995, the FDA told British Biotech that cancer antigens alone could not
be used as surrogate markers for tumor progression; that, in order to
193. In re Marion Merrell Dow Se. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,776, at 97,763 (.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 1993).
194. h re Biogen See. Litig., 179 ER.D. 25, 30 (D. Mass. 1997).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 37.
197. In re British Biotech PLC, et al., SEC Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9915
(June 10, 1999) (Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings and Order of the Commis-
sion)[hereinafter "British Biotech order"], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-41505.htm
(last visited March 21, 2002). Respondents neither admitted nor denied the SEC's findings in
the settlement leading to the order.
198. Id. Part lI.B.2.
199. Id.
2001-2002]
170 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 8:115
obtain marketing approval, the company would have to show a
correlation between antigen levels and more conventional endpoints; and
that, without that information, an interpretation of antigen data would be
"unintelligible." In May, the FDA repeated its position but permitted the
company to proceed with the proposed test.20°
On December 12, 1995, British Biotech filed a Form 6-K with the
SEC, incorporating a November 30 press release saying that its drug had
shown "a positive biological effect on blood concentrations of cancer
specific antigens which are recognized as surrogate markers of tumor
progression or regression."20' On May 21, 1996, British Biotech issued a
press release saying that the "[p]ositive... results presented in Novem-
ber... 'have been confirmed in larger patient numbers.',
20 2
In response to the May 21 release, the FDA issued a Notice of Viola-
tion to British Biotech, informing the company that the press release was
misleading because, among other things, it did not disclose the FDA's
position on antigen data. The Notice stated that "the relevance of the
'positive' cancer antigen data is vastly overstated."2 3 British Biotech re-
peated the statements made in its May press release in several Form 6-Ks
that it filed with the SEC and in a Form 20-F In none of these filings or
the press releases did British Biotech disclose the FDA position on the
use of antigen levels to evaluate drug efficacy. The company finally did
so in November 1996. °'
The SEC instituted an administrative proceeding against British Bio-
tech. While the company settled for a cease and desist order, the
Commission found that the filings with the SEC had contained:
materially misleading statements concerning the results [the
drug] was showing in the clinical trials. In these reports, British
Biotech claimed that [the drug] was showing effectiveness...
primarily based upon the antigen data, but omitted to disclose
the FDA's position that cancer antigens alone could not be used
to establish efficacy, that to establish efficacy British Biotech
would have to show a correlation between the antigen data and a
more conventional endpoint such as the measurement of tumor
200. Id. Part Il.B.3.
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size by X-ray, and that the antigen data could not be used to
support FDA approval.205
There are many differences between Biogen and British Biotech.
First, the comments by the FDA Director to Biogen simply articulated an
implication from the Phase II Hirulog test results, which had been pub-
lished by March 14, 1994, a little over a month after the FDA Director
made his comment on February 4. Those publicly reported results re-
vealed that the drug had not demonstrated efficacy as to the Phase II
prospectively defined primary endpoint. It is quite arguable that the FDA
comment-that Phase II results raised concerns about the drug's effi-
cacy-would have added little or nothing to the information already
public by March 14.206 In contrast, the FDA position on antigen data in
British Biotech was no mere articulation of some obvious implication
from data that the company published. Instead, the FDA position was, at
least as far as sufficiency for licensing, directly contrary to the com-
pany's statement that antigens "are recognized as surrogate markers of
tumor progression or regression."20
Second, the FDA Director's remarks to Biogen were in the context
of FDA's support for Phase III Hirulog trials against Heparin for treat-
ment of unstable angina. While the FDA had permitted British Biotech
to go forward with its test (as apparently was required since the test did
not pose a safety threat),'O8 the FDA never encouraged British Biotech,
and the FDA comments were in the context of (1) grudging approval for
the test and (2) a Notice of Violation.
Finally, the FDA did not tell Biogen that any of its public an-
nouncements were misleading. In the Notice of Violation, the FDA told
British Biotech just that.
205. Id. Part II.C. The SEC pursued British Biotech under section 13(a) of the Exchange
Act and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-16, requiring foreign private issuers of registered securities to
provide reports on Forms 6-K and 20-K, and under Rule 12b-20, requiring that all periodic
reports include information as may be necessary to make required statements not misleading.
206. There is a good deal of authority for the proposition that an issuer cannot be liable
for failure to repeat facts that are already publicly reported. See Heliotrope General, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 980-81 (9th Cir. 1999) (no duty to disclose relative costs and
benefits of maintaining tax strategy where "the market was aware [through the financial press]
of the mounting costs associated with the tax strategy, from which the market could have in-
ferred that the strategy might one day be abandoned as too costly"); In re Sybase, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 48 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961-62 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (granting summary judgment. "In this
case, Sybase's product issues were amply reported by industry analysts in numerous publica-
tions. Thus, the statements concerning Sybase's alleged product problems are not actionable
as a matter of law, because they were known to the market").
207. British Biotech order, supra note 197, Part I.B.4.
208. Id. Part II.B.3. ("The FDA cannot stop the commencement of a clinical trial based
upon problems in the protocol unless those problems pose a safety issue.").
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When the FDA provides a private, negative comment to a company
which then makes a positive public statement about its clinical tests, the
significance of the FDA comment goes mostly to the probability that the
tests will lead to FDA approval and the speed with which that might
happen. If the negative view is merely one expressed by the FDA staff
and takes the form of an inquiry, it may not be material (or at least the
company may have no scienter in failing to disclose it), even if the ques-
tion implies staff concern about the tests, provided that the company's
view that the criticism is unwarranted falls within the range of scientific
reasonableness. This is the MedImmune message, tempered by the cau-
tion that a life sciences company should be careful, in stating its own
scientifically reasonable view, about implying that the FDA does or must
agree.
If the company has already published the hard data on which the
FDA's comment is based and if the securities market is likely to know
how the FDA views such data (as in Biogen), then the FDA's comment
itself adds little to the market's calculation of license probability and
timing. In that event, the FDA communication should be immaterial. If,
however, the FDA view is based on data that the company is not
disclosing or if (as alleged in British Biotech) the market is likely to be
unaware of the FDA's view of the data or if (as alleged in Marion
Merrell Dow) the company has disclosed neither the data nor the FDA
comment, then the marginal importance of the FDA's views may be
greater. If the FDA flatly states that a company's public statement is
misleading (as alleged in British Biotech), the company should think
long and hard before publicizing positive test results without also airing
its dispute with the agency. Similarly, if FDA staff have actually
delivered a draft report directly contrary to the company's position (as
alleged in Zila), then the company should think carefully about
reiterating its view without also disclosing the fact and substance of the
FDA report.
Assuming that the analysis just suggested shows that the FDA's
comments are important, there is at least one additional consideration.
The company may believe that the FDA is mistaken and that it can con-
vince the agency of its error. If the company reasonably concludes that it
can persuade the FDA on the issue in a time period that is modest in
comparison to the then-projected schedule for FDA approval, the FDA
comment should not be material while the company attempts to convince
the FDA of its error. A company employing this strategy, however,
should periodically reevaluate its judgment that the FDA comment is
immaterial for this reason. As time passes, the probability that the FDA's
yet-unchanged position may significantly delay or altogether scuttle ap-
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proval may increase to such a level that the agency's comment or ques-
tion becomes "material" under the securities laws.
B. Company Characterization of Interim FDA Action
Life sciences companies face a somewhat different problem when
the FDA takes action while clinical tests are underway. In that event, the
market may expect the company to explain the significance of the action
and, in particular, what the action portends for licensure. Companies
may be tempted to provide their opinions on that portent. But doing so
may create serious problems.
One court refused to dismiss a claim that a company had violated
1Ob-5 by publicly suggesting that the FDA had approved a request to end
patient randomization because the FDA had favorably reviewed interim
clinical data. The company argued there was "no basis... for inferring
that... [it] was not justified in assuming that permission had been
granted based on the test results it submitted together with the request." "
The court responded that if the company "merely assumed the signifi-
cance of the FDA's permission... then it was reckless to make the
factual assertion that the presentation of the data and the FDA's action
were causally connected., 2'0 Another court refused to dismiss a claim
against a company that had attributed a delay in Advisory Committee
action to the Committee's need to absorb test information, when the sub-
sequent adverse Committee decision suggested that the delay might
arguably have been due to concern over whether the clinical trial demon-
strated efficacy.
211
209. In re PLC Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 119 (D. Mass. 1999).
210. Id. The court held that:
so much of [one release] stating that "[d]ue to the dramatic differences in the clini-
cal outcomes between the TMR group and the medical therapy group the FDA has
allowed PLC Systems to stop randomizing patients," and so much of [a second re-
lease] claiming that "[a]s a result [of reviewing the data], the FDA allowed the
Company to stop randomizing patients to medical therapy," are actionable .... Pre-
sented as assertions of fact, the capacity of the statements to mislead is apparent. A
reasonable investor would have concluded from these statements that the FDA had
made a preliminary endorsement of The Heart Laser's therapeutic efficacy.
Id.
211. hi re MedImmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F Supp. 953, 963 (D. Md. 1995). One de-
fendant in MedImmune had said that "[u]ntil they ... reach a comfort level of having gone
through everything, they don't feel comfortable going through the Advisory Committee" and
was reported as saying that "the FDA has been unable to complete all of its necessary work on
the application:' Id. at 963. The court viewed this as at least potentially misleading:
Arguably both of these statements were attempts to reassure the public that FDA's
postponement of the drug review was not a cause for concern and simply a matter
of routine. But the comments of Dorothy Scott, staff fellow at FDA's Office of
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These decisions suggest that companies do well to simply report
FDA interim actions without public comment attributing those actions to
some inferred FDA view that a drug or device works or is likely to re-
ceive FDA sanction in some speedy way, or at all. In many cases, such
comments may be only an educated guess. A court could later conclude
that publicizing such speculation is reckless in a 1Ob-5 sense. If a com-
pany does make a public interpretive comment on FDA action, it may
wish to state clearly that only the FDA knows for certain why it took the
interim action, that the FDA has not stated a reason to the company (if
indeed this is the case), and that the company is providing only its own
opinion.
C. Disclosing Application Denials
While it might seem at first blush to be straightforward, even report-
ing licensing denials can prove surprisingly tricky. Of course, if the FDA
has disapproved applications, it is improper to continue to state simply
that "preliminary FDA action ... is expected shortly.' 212 But what may
appear to be a final denial may, in the end, simply comprise a turn in a
winding road that leads to a licensed, viable product. What can a com-
pany say when it believes that to be true?
The SEC's pending action against ICN presents this case. The SEC
alleges that: ICN sought approval of ribavirin (trade name Virazole) as a
monotherapy treatment for chronic hepatitis C. On November 25, 1994,
the FDA informed ICN by letter that the application was "not approv-
able" because the data in the application failed to show safe and
efficacious treatment. On November 29, representatives of the FDA told
ICN in a phone conversation that the application was "not fixable." On
December 5, ICN issued a press release which did not say that the FDA
had denied the drug application but indicated that the company was
amending its application to seek approval for the drug as a component of
a combination therapy:
Blood Research and Review ... suggest that, by the time of the statements, FDA
may have taken a harder line and MedImmune may in fact have been aware of con-
siderably more serious reasons for the postponement.... If FDA had indeed
communicated such concern to Medlmmune and did so in such a way as to indicate
that ultimate approval of Respivir looked problematic, then Hockmeyer's state-
ments could possibly have misled an investor into thinking that the review process
remained totally problem-free.
Id. at 968.
212. SEC v. Schiffer, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,247, at
91,082-83 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1998) (granting preliminary injunction); see also SEC v. Schif-
fer, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,426 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2001) (granting SEC's
unopposed motion for summary judgment against estates of defendants who did not settle).
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We are pleased the FDA has reviewed our application so quickly,
and we will respond promptly as well. Amendment of applica-
tions are [sic] a common component of an often lengthy
regulatory review process ... We see this as another step in the
process... We believe that Virazole has an important therapeu-
tic role to play in the treatment of chronic hepatitis C. In order to
expedite the review process and make Virazole available to pa-
tients as soon as possible, our amended application probably will
include a request for approval of Virazole as a treatment of hepa-
titis C in combination with other drug therapies.2 3
The SEC sued ICN, claiming that the press release violated 1Ob-5
because it failed to reveal that the FDA had sent ICN a "not approvable"
letter and had concluded that the data in ICN's application failed to show
that Virazole safely and effectively treated hepatitis C.21 4 The company
responded that, although the release failed to use the words "not approv-
able," (1) the company's statement that it would probably submit an
amended application for Virazole's use in combination with other drugs
was a clear signal that the FDA had not licensed Virazole as a monother-
apy; (2) the release correctly forecasted that ICN would pursue approval
for the drug's use in a combination therapy; (3) the company did indeed
proceed with combination therapy studies with FDA sanction; and
(4) the FDA ultimately licensed Virazole to treat hepatitis C in combina-
tion with interferon." 5 The court denied ICN's motion to dismiss the
Commission's complaint. 6
The Commission's view reflects a continuing tension in its analysis.
On the one hand, the SEC recognizes the power of the efficient market
analysis, which assumes that financial professionals set the price after
conducting sophisticated analysis often based on industry-specific exper-
tise. Securities analysts specializing in life sciences stocks may well
realize that a company files an amended application only when the FDA
has effectively denied the original application. On the other hand, the
SEC is also concerned about the unsophisticated investor and, therefore,
may require companies to phrase disclosures in a way that even the naif
may understand.
213. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief 35, SEC v. ICN
Pharmaceuticals, et al., Civil Action No. SACV 99-1016 DOC (ANx) [hereinafter "ICN
Case"] (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 11, 1999).
214. Id. T 36.
215. Defendants' Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judg-
ment at 22-24, 32-33, ICN Case (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 8, 1999).
216. See Civil Minutes, ICN Case (Dec. 7, 1999) (also declining to address defendants'
motion for summary judgment as premature).
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ICN is still pending, and the company may ultimately prevail or the
case may settle. It illustrates, however, that when the FDA tells a
company it will not approve a pending application, the company may
find itself in securities litigation if it reports that news in a way that
avoids the pejorative the FDA used to describe its action..2 7 A company
facing ICN facts may find it is safer to expressly state that the FDA has
not approved an application, then go on to discuss any further steps the
company plans.
IV. DISCLOSING AND COMMENTING ON GOVERNMENT
INSPECTIONS, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS
The government pervasively regulates biotechnology companies.
Aside from licensing products, the government inspects those compa-
nies, requires remedial action where inspectors find compliance failures,
investigates suspected wrongdoing (including the submission of false
data), and in extreme cases, even criminally prosecutes company em-
ployees and executives. As regulatory actions pass along the continuum
from the routine to the disturbing and even to the corporate life-
threatening, life sciences companies can find it difficult to discern the
difference between events that must be disclosed and those that need not
be published. Since these regulatory actions frequently appear to be "bad
news," which the companies would prefer not to announce, they are akin
to negative test results and raise the same two disclosure questions:
(1) when is the regulatory event "material" and (2) when does the com-
pany have a duty to disclose it.
A. Materiality
The mere fact that the FDA conducts an inspection is not by itself
material. Inspections are routine events in the industry,2'8 and the invest-
217. See also In re Zila, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99-0115 PHX EHC (CP), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15800 (D. Or. Oct. 13, 2000) (denying motion to dismiss where the company allegedly
stated that it expected FDA approval in three to four months, after the FDA had refused an
application as inadequate on its face but before the company submitted an amended applica-
tion; stated, again before submitting an amended application, that everything requested by the
FDA had been provided and that the company was simply waiting to hear from the agency;
submitted a second application that the FDA summarily refused, then submitted a third; and
stated, after an FDA advisory panel unanimously recommended against approval on the basis
of insufficient data, that the panel had recommended "a refinement of data" and that there was
"confusion over some of the data:' Id. at *5. After the company issued the press release with
these last comments, the FDA warned the company that the release was not accurate because
the FDA panel had recommended a study with a different design).
218. See Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 894 F Supp. 661, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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ment professionals who follow biotechnology companies presumably
know this. The case becomes harder when, after an inspection, the FDA
notifies a company of problems the company must correct. At that point,
the company must determine whether it should disclose now an event the
importance of which will be determined in the future, when the company
learns to a certainty whether it has satisfactorily corrected the difficul-
ties, and, if so, at what cost.
One frequently useful tool to evaluate the "materiality" of events
with future implications is a test developed in the merger context. In
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,1 9 the Supreme Court rejected a bright line test
that merger discussions were only "material" if they progressed to the
point of an "agreement-in-principle." Instead, the Court held that "mate-
riality 'will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magni-
tude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.' " 0
In the life sciences context, this means the results of an FDA inspec-
tion are not material, even when the FDA demands corrective action, if
the company reasonably estimates that it can accomplish that corrective
action' by spending an amount of money that is modest in comparison
to the company's overall finances and if taking the corrective action will
not have some other important effect, such as delaying the introduction
of a company's only product past a critical market window."
219. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
220. Id. at 238, quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
221. In Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1995), the FDA inspected
the defendant's Kansas City plant three times. The first inspection revealed 34 deficiencies;
the second, 14 deficiencies. But the third inspection found 85 manufacturing deficiencies and
led to suspension of production. In holding that the first two inspections, and their results,
were not material, the court observed that between the two inspections the number of defi-
ciencies had been cut by more than half, "indicating that the plant was improving' and that
the FDA had not imposed any sanctions on the subsidiary. Id. at 52.
222. Robbins, 894 F Supp. at 674 ("Because ... Defendants reasonably believed that
compliance costs resulting from the inspection were minimal, it was neither false nor materi-
ally misleading to state on March 30, 1990, that Moore believed it was in material compliance
with the relevant regulations."); see also Acito, 47 F.3d at 52-53 (affirming dismissal of com-
plaint and stating, in a case where the defendant produced over 1,000 products in over 30
countries, that it "would be unduly burdensome and impractical to publicly disseminate the
results of every inspection of every plant").
If it were possible to tell in advance how its stock price would react, that information
might help a company considerably in evaluating materiality. See Employer-Teamsters v.
America West, [2001-02 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,606, at 97,550 (D.
Or. May 31, 2001) ("The information about America West's maintenance issues, the FAA
investigation and the FAA settlement agreement [including a $5 million fine) ... was obvi-
ously not material to the reasonable investor because the market did not react when this
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Nevertheless, some government actions may lead to very serious re-
suits for a company. In Morse v. Abbott Laboratories,' plaintiffs alleged
these facts: the FDA began an inspection of the defendant's pharmaceu-
tical facilities in North Chicago on July 5, 1989. The inspection lasted
until November 3, when the FDA issued a report noting 56 deficiencies.
After the FDA found Abbott's response insufficient, the agency imposed
sanctions. The sanctions included the prohibition against Abbott's selling
affected products to any federal agency and a hold on FDA approvals for
New Drug Applications and Abbreviated New Drug Applications until
Abbott took action that the FDA deemed adequate. Plaintiffs alleged that
Abbott did not disclose any of this during a class period running from
February 21, 1989, through March 20, 1990.24 In denying a motion to
dismiss, the court found that plaintiffs' allegations described "material"
events. "The complaint describes a situation in which a corporation and
its 'insiders' realized the significance of FDA sanctions, know about
FDA inspections of their facilities, the violations uncovered and the
sanctions imposed, and do not thereafter disclose this material informa-
tion on SEC filings." '
Stated differently, and assuming for purposes of analysis that the
plaintiffs' allegations were true, there was a point when Abbott knew that
the probability of sanctions was sufficiently high and the consequences
of the possible sanctions sufficiently harmful that the regulatory action
was "material?' The court unfortunately does not identify that point by
date or particular event.
A more recent case, also involving Abbott Laboratories, resulted in a
different outcome. That case shows that courts are sometimes reluctant
to second-guess a company conclusion that an adverse post-inspection
write-up is not material because, under the circumstances and taking into
account the company's experience with the agency, the company
believes the FDA is unlikely to impose significant sanctions. In this later
Abbott case, the court recounted these allegations: The FDA inspected
Abbott's Diagnostic Division ("ADD") several times after 1993, each
time noting shortcomings in quality-control policies and practices.
Abbott operated under a compliance plan from July 1995 through
February 1998, and the agency noted its continuing concerns at the end
of that plan. The FDA conducted another inspection in September and
November 1998, and informed Abbott of regulatory violations in
information was disclosed."). The problem, of course, is that the company must make its mate-
riality judgment before this market test occurs.
223. 756 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. fI1. 1991).
224. Id. at 1109.
225. Id. at 1111.
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November 1998 and January 1999. Abbott did not disclose any of this in
its 10-K filed March 9, 1999.226
On March 17, 1999, the FDA issued a warning letter to Abbott iden-
tifying several continuing violations and advising that the agency would
take enforcement measures without further warning if the company did
not immediately resolve its compliance issues. While Abbott did not dis-
close this letter, Bloomberg News reported it on June 15. After the FDA
concluded an additional inspection in July, it issued another Form 483
noting further violations. The company then acknowledged in a Septem-
ber 29 press release both the FDA's allegations and the threat of
enforcement action. The company said that it was attempting to negoti-
ate a consent decree but contested the charges against it.
227
On November 2, 1999, Abbott entered into a consent decree agree-
ing to pay a $100 million civil fine and withdraw 125 products from the
market. This was reportedly the largest fine ever imposed by the FDA.
The company announced a $168 million pretax charge related to the fine
and an inventory write-down. Its stock fell. Shareholders sued, starting
their class period on March 17,2'8 and focusing on Abbott's failure to
promptly disclose the warning letter of that date and the last Form 483.
In granting Abbott's motion to dismiss, the district court acknowl-
edged that the company omitted facts about its ongoing problems with
the FDA. However, it found the omitted facts immaterial.
The history between Abbott and the FDA makes all the undis-
closed information, viewed in context, seem fairly
inconsequential. An investor with full information would see a
series of inspections, Forms 483, negotiations, re-inspections,
more Forms 483 and more negotiations. Abbott had also been in,
and out, of an FDA monitoring plan. Plaintiffs appear to concede
that events prior to March 17 did not require disclosure to that
point. Given the repeating cycle of inspections, findings and ne-
gotiations, without any FDA sanctions, plaintiffs must give us a
reason to believe this time was different-something that shows
Abbott's prospects had genuinely changed or something from
the FDA that said, "This time we're serious." Plaintiffs have
failed to do [so].
There is nothing magical about the warning letter. Although the
language sounds ominous, it really is rather boilerplate. [Citation
226. Anderson v. Abbott Lab., 140 F. Supp. 2d 894,900 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
227. Id. at 900-01.
228. Id. at 901.
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omitted.] This is affirmed by the market's reaction.... The
Bloomberg News report prompted no substantial movement [in
Abbott's stock price]. If reasonable investors believed the letter
altered the total mix of information, the market would have re-
acted, at least a little bit.
The May-July 1999 inspection also undermines plaintiffs'
claims. Clearly, if the FDA were planning another audit, the
agency had not yet decided to sanction Abbott, certainly so far
as defendants could tell. Abbott had no reason to say anything, at
least until after the new inspection.... Even after the inspection
and the resulting Form 483, plaintiffs have not alleged facts
suggesting this was any different from the many prior
inspections and Form 483 findings. 9
Stated another way, taking into account the history of Abbott's rela-
tionship with the FDA, the omitted facts did not suggest a sufficiently
high probability of the unprecedented sanctions ultimately imposed to
make the inspections or the FDA forms and letters material under the
probability/magnitude analysis.
When the Seventh Circuit affirmed Abbott, it expressed skepticism
about this approach to the extent the trial court employed it to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), but nevertheless acknowledged that it might be cor-
rect under the Reform Act."° Therefore, companies facing similar
circumstances should maintain silence only with caution. But, putting
aside the specifics of the Abbott case, the greater point is that the FDA is
an aggressive regulator, not shy of confrontational tactics. A company
should be able to use its history with the agency as at least one guide in
deciding just what sanctions a threatening letter is likely to bring.
While disclosure questions raised by FDA inspections can be diffi-
cult, biotechnology companies have faced even more traumatic issues
accompanying serious suspicion of, investigation of, and even criminal
prosecution for, submitting false data to the agency. If a company delib-
erately falsifies data, the government will withdraw permission to market
the medical device or drug that the company obtained by an application
containing material afalsehoods."1 It may "disqualify" a testing facility
229. Id. at 902.
230. Gallagher v. Abbott Lab., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming on the
ground that plaintiffs failed to identify any false statement by the company that was
misleading because it omitted the FDA's demands. The court rejected the argument that Abbott
had a duty to update its March 9 10-k by disclosing the March 17 letter).
231. The Secretary of Health and Human Services "shall" withdraw premarket approval
for a medical device if the Secretary finds "that the application [for approval] contained or was
accompanied by an untrue statement of a material fact" 21 U.S.C. § 360e(e)(1)(C) (1994).
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for failure to comply with regulations, thereby effectively preventing the
use of any studies performed at that facility in applications for new ap-
provals.z2 If a company is convicted of a crime committed in the course
of seeking approval for a generic drug, the law requires the government
to debar the company from submitting any further applications for such
drugs."3 The FDA may also place a company on an Alert List, which
may diminish its prospects for obtaining new approvals. 2
Where senior executives are not involved in the compilation of the
data under investigation, management may only come to a full under-
standing of the facts and their consequences over time. At first,
management may have only a sketchy report of irregularity. An internal
investigation, an FDA investigation, or both, may follow. As inquiry pro-
ceeds, more facts may come to light, including whether there was indeed
falsification and, if so, how extensive it might have been. After the facts
are fully developed, the FDA must determine which of its panoply of
remedies to invoke.
The Secretary "shall" also withdraw approval of any new drug application upon such a find-
ing. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1994).
232. The Commissioner of Food and Drugs can disqualify a testing facility which has
failed to comply with regulations, if the noncompliance adversely affected the validity of
nonclinical laboratory studies and other lesser regulatory actions (e.g., warnings or rejections
of individual studies) have not been or probably will not be adequate to achieve compliance.
21 C.F.R. § 58.202 (2001). Disqualification permits the FDA to exclude from its consideration
completed studies that the facility performed in the past "until it can be adequately demon-
strated that ... noncompliance did not occur during, or did not affect the validity or
acceptability of data generated by, a particular study." 21 C.F.R. § 58.200. Any study that the
facility performed "before or after disqualification may be presumed to be unacceptable ....
No nonclinical laboratory study begun by a testing facility after the date of the facility's dis-
qualification shall be considered in support of any application for a research or marketing
permit, unless the facility has been reinstated... " 21 C.FR. § 58.210.
233. If the Secretary of Health and Human Services finds that a company has been con-
victed of a federal felony for conduct relating to the development or approval of an
abbreviated drug application for a generic drug, the Secretary "shall debar such [company]
from submitting, or assisting in the submission of, any such application." 21 U.S.C.
§ 335a(a)(1) (1994). The Secretary shall also withdraw approval of any abbreviated drug ap-
plication obtained, expedited or facilitated through bribery, illegal gratuity, fraud, or material
false statement. 21 U.S.C. § 335c(a)(1).
234. One commentator described the Alert List and its effect in these words:
The FDA has at various times maintained lists of those whom FDA enforcement of-
ficials suspected of cheating. The secret and controversial "Alert List" warned FDA
drug reviewers to be wary of submissions made by certain named suspects.
The withdrawal of a new drug application (NDA) that had been "erroneously"
granted to a company on the FDA's Alert List because of flaws in factory good
manufacturing practices has been upheld in court.
I JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 6.06, at 6-12 to 6-13 (2d ed.
1995).
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In deciding when and what to disclose under these circumstances, it
can be helpful to recall the materiality test that considers both the prob-
ability of adverse consequences and their magnitude. The SEC itself has
suggested that this analysis is appropriate when a government investiga-
tion is underway. In 1988, the Commission released a statement to guide
defense contractors in satisfying their disclosure obligations during on-
going government investigations into illegal or unethical activity. The
SEC recognized that, during an investigation, "the exact subjects and
scope of the government's inquiry are still unknown"' - Calling ex-
pressly on the probability/magnitude test, the Commission wrote:
The potential effects of the government's inquiry must be dis-
cussed in the Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations ("MD&A") in a
company's annual and quarterly reports as well as transactional
filings, if in light of the associated probabilities and magni-
tudes, the effects may be material. Such a discussion should be
included where the registrant reasonably expects that the gov-
ernment's inquiry will have a material adverse effect on a
company's financial condition, liquidity, capital resources, net
sales, revenues or income from continuing operations, or such
inquiry otherwise would cause a material change in the relation-
ship between costs and revenues. Disclosure also should be
provided where, in light of the uncertainty regarding the gov-
ernment's inquiry, reported financial information would not
necessarily be indicative of the company's future operating re-
sults or financial condition.26
The law on this subject has multiple, and at first confusing, levels. In
determining whether the facts are "material" as of the date the company
is considering disclosure, the company must peer into what can be a
murky future to try to assess the probability of such events as 1) whether
witness interviews and document review will prove that employees falsi-
fied data, 2) the extent of the falsification, 3) the resulting FDA action
and the consequences of that action to the company, and 4) the effect on
the company's future of discontinuing an illegal practice that may have
contributed to past success. However, even though the company has
made its own estimate of what action the government may take in apply-
ing the probability/magnitude test, the company need not disclose that
235. 53 Fed. Reg. 29226, 29227 (Aug. 3, 1988).
236. Id. (emphasis added).
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predicted government action.3  In most cases where the probabil-
ity/magnitude test suggests materiality, the currently known facts
constituting the existing "material" information will simply be the fact of
the government investigation." The company should be able to satisfy
any disclosure obligation by saying only that the investigation exists and
say that it could lead to government action that could materially and ad-
versely affect the company and its operations and results. The disclosure
need not predict what the government will do nor quantify the impact of
government action on the company.
Known but unfiled government legal proceedings can also be mate-
rial. 9 When a company actually knows the government's next legal
move, it is not speculation to disclose it. To determine whether the
known future proceeding is currently "material," the SEC has-at least
in a pronouncement aimed at the defense industry-again suggested us-
ing the probability/magnitude test:
Disclosure also is required of material pending legal proceed-
ings involving a company or its subsidiaries. Legal proceedings
237. i re Par Pharm., Inc. See. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Plain-
tiffs' contention that the documents Par disseminated to the public or filed with the SEC
should have predicted the consequences of discovery of the bribery scheme and its cessation
cannot be the basis of Rule lOb-5 liability"; "[Tihe company was not obligated to speculate as
to the myriad of consequences, ranging from minor setbacks to complete ruin, that might have
befallen the company if the bribery scheme was discovered, disclosed or terminated."); see
also Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 . Supp. 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
Wilfred was not obligated to disclose information of which it had no knowledge or
about which it could only speculate. Indeed, it would be misleading for it to do
so.... [D]efendants were not bound to predict as the 'imminent' or 'likely' out-
come of the investigations that indictments of Wilfred and its chief officer would
follow, with financial disaster in their train.
Id. at 248(citations omitted).
238. The failure to disclose the fact of a serious investigation can be actionable. See, e.g.,
in re Independent Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 741,760 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(failure to disclose "formal investigation" by regulatory agency, which was the highest level of
investigation, was actionable where investigation was not routine and where agency had right
to impose a license condition prohibiting company from accepting certain new business).
239. 17 C.ER. § 229.103 (2000) is applicable to filings under both the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act, and requires that issuers:
Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary rou-
tine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of its
subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the subject. Include the
name of the court or agency in which the proceedings are pending, the date insti-
tuted, the principal parties thereto, a description of the factual basis alleged to
underlie the proceeding and the relief sought. Include similar information as to any
such proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities.
Id. (emphasis added).
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known to be contemplated by government agencies similarly
should be disclosed where management reasonably believes that
such government action will have a material effect upon the
company and its business. In this regard, disclosure of known
contemplated government proceedings may be required where
the result may be the cancellation of a government contract, sus-
pension of payments under a contract, termination of further
business with the government, or alteration of the registrant's
procedures for obtaining government contracts.4
Assuming that application of the probability/magnitude test suggests
that an investigation is material, the question remains whether the under-
lying circumstances being investigated are also material facts that should
be disclosed . Where those facts are clear and the relationship of the
facts to the investigation or to the company's success are easily under-
stood-e.g., where a company has talked up the high rate of FDA
approvals for company drug applications, the authorities are investigat-
ing bribery of FDA officials who could influence approvals, and the
company has verified that the bribery took place and very likely influ-
enced drug approvals-the underlying facts could themselves be
material. However, where the facts are unclear or are extremely technical
240. 53 Fed. Reg. 29226, at 29227 (Aug. 3, 1988) (emphasis added).
241. A number of decisions from outside the biotechnology industry hold that illegal
conduct posing a real threat to the continuation of a business may be a "material" fact. Its
materiality may derive either from the circumstance that disclosure of the illegal conduct
could harm the business by, for example, threatening vital licenses, or from the circumstance
that discontinuation of an illegal practice might deprive the issuer of an advantage that has
been important to its success. See Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 119 (2d
Cir. 1982); Roeder v. Alpha Industries, 814 E2d 22, 26 (Ist Cir. 1987); Greenfield v. Profes-
sional Care, Inc., 677 F Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F.
Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1978). It may also be actionable to report financial numbers where
the operations generating them are illegal and the illegal conduct is not disclosed. Levitan v.
McCoy, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,608, at 97,560 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 20, 2001) (denying motion to dismiss claim that earnings were overstated because bank
credit card division has been systematically violating Truth in Lending Act); Gaming Lottery
Sec. Litig., [2000-01 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,339, at 95,939 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 27, 2001) (granting summary judgment on liability against certain defendants. "For De-
fendants to include the operating revenues of Specialty Manufacturing together with those of
Gaming Lottery in its quarterly financial reports without disclosing the material risk to Gam-
ing Lottery of operating without a license constitutes concealment of a material fact:').
In Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, the Commission staff took the position that compa-
nies cannot evaluate materiality by quantitative economic effect alone. The staff listed
"concealment of an unlawful transaction" among the considerations that could render material
a numerically small misstatement on a financial statement. 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, at 45,152
(1999). While this Bulletin concerned misstatements in financials (and particularly "managed
earnings"), the SEC may apply its reasoning to other disclosures. If so, it will make even more
difficult the task of determining whether misconduct is material.
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and their interpretation is uncertain-as may often be the case in the life
sciences context-it should be sufficient to disclose the investigation and
not the facts themselves.
Even where the facts are clear, it may be sufficient to disclose the in-
vestigation and possible (but not predicted) consequences. In leradi v.
Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,242 the trial court dismissed a 10(b) case against
a drug manufacturer the Federal Trade Commission had sued for re-
straint of trade. Mylan disclosed the FTC investigation in its SEC filings
and asserted that such "governmental inquiries [are] ... inherently un-
certain" and that, "[t]he Company may be unable to realize [its] plans
and objectives... due to various important factors, including.., if the
FTC concludes, on the basis of its investigation, that the Company has
acted improperly?' 243 The shareholder bringing the securities action
claimed the company improperly failed to disclose two exclusive supply
contracts which allegedly gave the company the market power to impose
the price increases that prompted the FTC investigation. The Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal, finding no error in the district court's
conclusion that "the existence and substance of the exclusive supply con-
tracts was immaterial.' 24
[A]Ithough [plaintiff] does allege that the contracts ... were
anticompetitive and in violation of the antitrust laws, we seri-
ously doubt that "the reasonable investor" possesses the depth of
antitrust law expertise that would allow him or her to conclude
that the contracts were susceptible to successful attack under the
antitrust laws. Knowledge that the FTC was engaging in an in-
vestigation of Mylan's extraordinary pricing.., because of its
[allegedly] anticompetitive activities was much more informa-
tive to "the reasonable investor" than information pertaining to
Mylan's exclusive contracts for raw materials for two of its
drugs.
2 4 5
242. 230 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2000).
243. Id. at 597 (alterations in original).
244. Id. at 599.
245. Id. at 600. Companies should rely on this decision with caution. Other courts could
emphasize that the efficient market theory rests on the assumption that experts evaluate public
information -about companies and make buy and sell recommendations and decisions, influ-
encing a sufficient number of trades to set stock prices. Following that line of analysis, a court
might conclude that the information about the contracts was material because these market
experts could evaluate the contracts' antitrust importance.
Flipping the Jeradi analysis, where regulatory action follows as a matter of course from
underlying facts, it may be sufficient to disclose those facts and not the resulting action. In re
K-tel Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 107 F Supp. 2d 994, 1005 (D. Minn. 2000) (where NASDAQ-
listed company published financials showing that its net tangible assets had fallen below the
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If this can be said about exclusive contracts and their antitrust implica-
tions, it might also be said about investigations of life sciences
companies that are, at bottom, scientific disputes.
Moreover, as a practical matter, a company will want to be cautious
in disclosing underlying facts relating to a government investigation. The
inherent uncertainties in collecting, verifying, and evaluating facts argue
against such disclosure except in the clearest cases. Even then, it may be
quite difficult to determine whether past conduct is material either be-
cause the government might issue sanctions that will significantly hurt
the company or because the company's discontinuation of an improper
practice which contributed to past success might significantly dim the
company's future prospects.
B. Duty To Disclose
Assuming that a company has applied the probability/magnitude test
and determined that regulatory events (or misdeeds by employees that
will have regulatory consequences) are "material," there remains the
question of when the biotechnology company must disclose this infor-
mation.
Turning back to two principal triggers for disclosure duty-trading
in the stock by the company or insiders and statements by the company
that are misleading if the company does not also reveal the regulatory
action-the most problematic cases will be those involving the latter.
Once the company has "material" information about an inspection, no-
tice of noncompliance, or government investigation, the company must
determine each time it speaks whether it should disclose the regulatory
development to prevent misleading by omission.
General laudatory comments about a company generally do not mis-
lead by a failure to disclose material, adverse regulatory action.24 6 Even a
statement that the company maintains "comprehensive quality assurance
programs" is too general to require disclosure of post-inspection FDA
advice that a manufacturing facility is out of compliance with agency
dollar minimum necessary for continued listing, failure to publicize NASD delisting letter did
not create a strong inference of fraudulent intent).
246. See Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 894 F Supp. 661, 666. 669-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (statements that newly acquired subsidiary "has established a fine reputation for quality
products" and was "highly regarded in the industry for its quality line of products" created no
duty to disclose difficulty in obtaining FDA approval of "recipes" for generic drugs it manu-
factured). See also Anderson v. Abbott Lab., 140 F. Supp. 2d 894, 909 (N.D. IIl. 2001)
(accurate report of past financial results is not misleading because the reporting company does
not simultaneously discuss regulatory problems. The accurate historical figures "do not sug-
gest anything about regulatory compliance that could be misleading:').
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rules.247 The undisclosed facts must bear a more specific relationship to
the company's comment before the securities laws require disclosure of
those facts to prevent the comment from deceiving investors. For exam-
ple, self-praise for a high rate of rapid FDA approvals may well create a
duty to reveal improprieties in company-FDA relations, such as illegal
gratuities paid to FDA personnel.24S
Not infrequently, biotech companies simply state that they believe
they are in material compliance with FDA regulations. If the company is
violating those regulations in an important way at the time it makes the
statement, the statement may be false and subsequent securities law
litigation could be based on that misrepresentation. If the company is not
committing a "material violation" at the time it makes the statement, the
statement is not "false.'249 But what if the company knows of FDA viola-
tions but is uncertain whether they will be prove to be significant?
247. Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("[The affirma-
tive statements in the SEC filings (i.e., that Sabratek and its subsidiaries operated an internal
quality assurance program) are far too attenuated from the alleged regulatory problems at the
flush syringe manufacturing facility to establish fraud.").
248. See In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, noting plaintiffs' theory that the public statements
touting Par's [and its subsidiary's] competitive advantage in obtaining FDA approv-
als... were false and misleading because defendants failed to disclose (1) that such
advantage was obtained through an illegal scheme of bribes rather than through de-
fendants' expertise and business acumen, and (2) that the public disclosure and/or
termination of the bribery scheme would have a profound harmful effect on Par's
sales, profit margins and earnings.
Id. at 675.). See also SEC v. Shah, [1994--1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
T 90,586, at 98,374 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1993) (further factual background on the In re Par
case).
See also In re Halsey Drug Co., Inc., Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-9230, 1997 WL
34873 (S.E.C. Jan. 28, 1997) (SEC found 10(b) violation where Halsey stated in 10-Ks that it
had to follow Current Good Manufacturing Practices ("CGMP") at all times, that it manufac-
tured an FDA-approved drug, and that, in order to comply with CGMP, it had to "expend time
money and effort in the areas of production and quality control to ensure full technical com-
pliance:' It failed to disclose that it was not complying with CGMP because it was using
unapproved formulas and procedures and that its employees, at the direction of management,
were concealing product adulteration from the FDA.).
249. Robbins v. Moore Medical Corp., 894 F. Supp. 661, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (no 10(b)
violation where the company had a reasonable basis for believing that the problems raised by
the FDA inspection to which plaintiffs pointed could be solved by spending a modest amount
of money. Accordingly, the company could properly say that it believed itself to be in "mate-
rial" compliance with statutes and regulations). Contrast Copley Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
[1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,695, at 92,256-57 (D. Mass. Mar. 16,
1995) (dismissal denied where defendants were allegedly aware of alterations to a drug coat-
ing without FDA approval and preparation of false batch production records, but company
stated that it was "in material compliance with CGMP").
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The probability/magnitude test may be helpful once more. In Chan v.
Orthologic Corp., the company's Director of Regulatory Affairs
allegedly told one of the individual defendants in 1995 that the company
was improperly marketing its OL 1000 device for unapproved uses."
Orthologic filed a 10-K on March 19, 1996, in which it stated, "The
Company believes that its operations are in material compliance with
applicable law"'z The company did not mention the Director of Regula-
tory Affairs' concern and did not mention any FDA interest in possibly
improper marketing. Dismissing the subsequent securities case, the court
focused on the probability of government action at the time Orthologic
filed the 10-K.
[I]f the company was truly aware of an impending FDA investi-
gation that was likely to result in sanctions against the
corporation, the 10-K was... misleading. On the other hand, if
the company was merely aware of the FDA's interest, but truly
thought that it was in material compliance with all FDA regula-
tions, the statement seems logically accurate. Thus, Plaintiffs
must allege facts establishing that the company knew that the
FDA was "intending" or "likely" to actually take action against
it. Plaintiffs have not done so. z2
Even the warning by the in-house compliance director was insuffi-
cient to require disclosure because it did "not establish that the company
knew that its statements.., were false. Thomas is not alleged to have
warned of an on-going FDA investigation; rather, Plaintiffs allege that he
warned the company of illegal promotional activities."' 3 Chan teaches
that the question of "material" compliance implicates (1) the degree of
any noncompliance, (2) the likelihood of resulting FDA action, and
(3) the projected impact of such action on the life sciences company.
C. How To Phrase a Disclosure
Once a company has decided to make a disclosure about (for exam-
ple) an FDA inspection and notification of noncompliance, there remains
the question of what the company should say. The company will be
tempted to state that the regulatory action has little significance. Where
250. Chan v. Orthologic Corp., No. Civ. 96-1514 PHX RCV, 1998 WL 1018624, at *1
(D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998).
251. Id. at *18. On April 29, 1996, the FDA wrote Orthologic to express the agency's
concern about improper marketing and promoting, and the FDA sent a formal Warning Letter
to Orthologic on May 31, 1996. Id. at *6. But these events occurred after the SEC filing.
252. Id. at "19.
253. Id. at *16.
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the company believes that to be true, has a reasonable basis for that be-
lief, and knows of no undisclosed fact that seriously undermines that
view, the company should be able to express its belief without incurring
securities law liability.
Shortly after Syntex signed a consent decree with the FDA requiring
the company to spend $2 million on corrective advertising for Syntex's
most important drug, the company stated in its annual report that:
Although the outcome cannot be predicted with certainty, it is
the opinion of management, based on advice of counsel,
including counsel advising Syntex on FDA matters, and other
considerations, that [the decree] should not have a material
adverse effect on the results of operations in the current fiscal
year ending July 31, 1992.25
The court dismissed a later securities lawsuit in which plaintiffs al-
leged that the consent decree, in fact, negatively affected Syntex's sales.
Holding that the Syntex statement had to be evaluated as of the time it
was made, the Ninth Circuit noted that the company distributed the an-
nual report less than three weeks after the consent decree was entered
and before the company had any way of knowing how that decree would
impact sales. The court also observed that plaintiffs had pointed to no
"inside knowledge" that contradicted Syntex's public statement. S
The carefully phrased, forward-looking Syntex statement contrasts
sharply with the more aggressive statements of the Westwood v. Cohen
defendants.2" As summarized by the court in deciding a motion to dis-
miss, Barr commented on FDA action in the following manner:
October 24, 1991: Barr announces that the FDA has recently
inspected two facilities and concluded that Barr might be in
violation of certain Current Good Manufacturing Practices.
Barr responds that many FDA observations were "trivial in
nature and could be considered subjective and retaliatory,"
adding that the inspection "uncovered no incidence of fraud,




254. In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1996)(emphasis omitted).
Phrasing a statement as an opinion will not necessarily remove it from securities law scrutiny.
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1108-09 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("As I understand the Court's opinion, the statement 'In the opinion of the Directors, this is a
high value for the shares' would produce liability if in fact it was not a high value and the
directors knew that").
255. Chan, 1998 WL 1018624 at*16.
256. Westwood v. Cohen, 838 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
257. Id. at 130.
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November 7: The Wall Street Journal reports that the FDA
presented Barr with a proposed consent decree requesting
that Barr cease manufacturing and distribution until certain
regulatory issues were resolved and also reports that the
company declined to agree to the decree. Barr's vice presi-
dent for finance and chief financial officer is quoted as
saying that there is "no question as to the safety or efficacy
of any of our products." 8
November 11: The vice president/CFO claims that the FDA
is trying to close Barr's manufacturing facilities due to "a
whole series of very technical issues. '9 9
April 27, 1992: Barr announces it has filed suit to stop the
FDA from enforcing an "Alert List" against some of the
company's products. The president/CEO says he does not
think that the FDA inspection raised "serious issues."26
April 29: Barr again says that the FDA "uncovered no inci-
dents of fraud, misrepresentation, deception or any similar
unlawful acts."
26
June 12: The FDA announces a lawsuit against Barr, seeking
an injunction prohibiting Barr from manufacturing or selling
pharmaceuticals. 62
June 15: Barr issues a press release asserting that the FDA
allegations are "consistent with the agency's pattern of re-
taliation against the company which testified against the
agency in Congress in 1989." The company repeats that "no
incidents of fraud, misrepresentations, deception or any
similar unlawful acts" have been uncovered.
August 24: Barr announces that the FDA is no longer seek-
ing a total shutdown but only asking the court to review
issues associated with specific products.2 4
February 4, 1993: A United States district court issues a pre-
liminary injunction against Barr, ordering suspension of
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 131.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 130 n.7, 131.
264. Id. at 131.
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24 products until completion of validation studies for each
and ordering recall of 12 batches of pharmaceuticals that
were released on the basis of potentially inaccurate test re-
suits or had content uniformity and assay problems.265
Plaintiff survived a motion to dismiss in the subsequent securities
case "because of Barr's affirmative comforting statements.'" The West-
wood opinion does not pinpoint what facts the company knew that made
its statements misleading. Thus, the case might be decided differently
now that the Reform Act explicitly demands that plaintiffs plead such
facts. As may have been the case in Xoma, the Westwood court may have
concluded the company went too far in public statements specifically
designed to minimize bad news.
'Two more recent cases focus on a company's knowledge and belief
about agency action. After the FDA issued warning letters following in-
spection of syringe manufacturing facilities, Sabratek issued press
releases saying that the company had already addressed the FDA's con-
cerns and that the company had no reservations about the safety of its
products. The FDA later denied a 501(k) application for the syringes,
and the company suspended production for a time, although ultimately
the agency approved a revised application. A securities lawsuit based in
part on the press releases failed because "the defendants' belief that Sa-
bratek had adequately addressed the FDA's concerns, although obviously
mistaken, was not obviously false " 67 Stated differently, plaintiff failed to
allege facts to show that the defendants did not genuinely believe their
statements or that the statements lacked any reasonable basis.
Sofamor Danek similarly disclosed an FDA warning letter but alleg-
edly "downplayed" its significance in ways not completely specified by
the court deciding the later securities case.2" Granting the motion to
dismiss that case, the court stressed that the company was under no duty
to express alarm:
If the company had... publicly predicted that the FDA would
move against the company, the opinion would have come to look
265. Id.
266. Id. at 134.
267. Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F Supp. 2d 827, 835 (N.D. Hl. 2000).
268. In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 E3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1106 (1998) involved alleged improper marketing, including sponsorship of seminars
in which the company's device was promoted for uses that the FDA had not approved.
Footnote 2 refers to a "conference call with stock analysts on October 20, 1993, when the
company's president allegedly downplayed the FDA's August warning letter and 'stated that
SDG would continue to comply with the FDA rules regarding medical education."' Id. at 401
n.2.
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increasingly questionable with the passage of time, and the pre-
diction would have proved to be flatly erroneous. This
illustrates, we think, why predictions not "substantially certain
to hold," like most matters of opinion, simply do not come
within the duty of disclosure.269
In these circumstances, a "we will respond to the agency promptly
and believe at this time that we can satisfy the FDA" comment should be
safe, provided the company does indeed hold this opinion and it is not
unreasonable. Of course, the company must, each time it speaks about
the FDA concern in the future, reevaluate the then-present circumstances
by considering the likelihood of additional government actions and the
degree to which those actions could affect the company. If the applica-
tion of the probability/magnitude test to unfolding events suggests that a
comment "downplaying" the government's actions is no longer justified,
the company should not continue to minimize the FDA's words and
deeds.
Four protocols will help biotechnology companies phrase disclo-
sures of negative regulatory action in ways that minimize the chances of
a lawsuit and maximize the chances for a successful early motion if a
lawsuit is filed. First, a company should consult with experienced securi-
ties counsel before it makes each disclosure. Second, a company should
disclose only the "material" facts of which it is certain. Since this may
change as management learns more, the company may want to state ex-
pressly that it is speaking "on the basis of the company's review to date"
and may wish to state that the investigation (or inspection or other regu-
latory action) is continuing. A company should not publicize what it only
infers, but has not yet confirmed-whether that be wrongdoing by em-
ployees, possible falsification of data, etc. Third, while a company may
wish to include in its disclosures a description of current government
action and even a description of possible further government actions and
a statement that such actions could have a material adverse economic
impact, the company should generally avoid publicly forecasting what
the government will do. For example, it is generally wise to abstain from
predicting that the government has nearly finished an investigation or
that the government will impose no penalties or sanctions. Finally, each
company facing such disclosures will be tempted to make statements
suggesting that regulatory actions are ill-founded or motivated by some
improper animus. As tempting as it is to make such statements, it may
prove prudent to avoid saying more than (assuming that the company can
269. Id. at 402.
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say this in good faith): "The company is responding to the agency's ac-
tions. While the company cannot predict final agency action or the
ultimate impact of such action on the company, the company believes, on
the basis of its investigation and analysis to date, that the facts do not
warrant a sanction.' Each time the company repeats this belief, it will
need to review the then-current facts and apply the probabil-
ity/magnitude analysis to confirm that the belief is still warranted.
CONCLUSION
As securities law meets the biotechnology industry, it comes face-to-
face with government regulation and science. Life sciences companies
and their investors can find FDA regulation frustratingly unpredictable,
particularly when it comes to forecasting drug or device approval. How
the companies, and the courts, address such forecasts will provide a cru-
cial test of the forward-looking statement provisions of the Reform Act.
Science may not provide the certainty that the layman expects, and
reports of clinical trials can require judgment calls. Companies will
struggle with those judgments and with how to convey sometimes com-
plicated test results and protocols to an investing public unversed in the
intricacies of biotechnology research. The courts, in their turn, must be
prepared to seriously address disclosures, even on motions to dismiss
without the benefit of discovery and a biostatistical tutorial.
As companies discuss their science with regulators, that very dia-
logue generates disclosure issues. Companies seeking the right balance
between keeping their shareholders informed and avoiding interpretation
of FDA action may find that courts later determine the companies have
gone too far in publishing inferences drawn from the agency's actions.
The biotechnology world will continue to be an arena in which
issuers must decide when to disclose government inspections (and, on
occasion, investigations) and what to say about them. The companies
will do so knowing that the SEC, and the courts, may review those
decisions months or years later to determine when, if ever, the
investigation became material and when, if ever, the company had a duty
to disclose it.
There may be no other industry in which these ingredients-
disclosure law, science and regulation-overlay each other in quite so
challenging a way.
2001-2002]
